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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 2a-3(h) of the Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The following issue is addressed by this appeal:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by concluding

that the failure of Defendant's counsel to draft the Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce to conform with nine (9) particular
and identifiable stipulations made on the record was not "good
cause" to enter an order nunc pro tunc?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW.

"Determining whether the

trial court properly utilized the legal doctrine of nunc pro tunc
. . . presents a question of law which we review for
correctness."

Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 977 (Utah

App. 1993)(citing Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah
App. 1990)).

Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l (1989),

the trial court may enter an order nunc pro tunc upon a finding
of good cause.

The Utah Court of Appeals gives the trial court

broad discretion in determining whether such good cause exists.
Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987) .
As stated in Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060, the
appellate court "may affirm 'if the trial court's decision can be
sustained on any proper legal basis.'"

(Quoting Taylor v. Estate

of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah App. 1989)).

It is the task

of the appellate court to "determine if the findings of the court
1

below or the undisputed evidence in the record support a decision
not to enter a nunc pro tunc order under section 30-4a-l."
Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d at 1060.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a-l:
Authority of court.
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be
ordered, enter an order nunc pro tunc in a matter
relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order on Plaintiff's Second
Motion to Set Aside Order dated and entered February 11, 1994.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered May
2, 1988. On or about September 8, 1989, Mrs. Robinson filed a
Petition to Modify Decree, concerning issues related to the case
and support of the parties' three children.

On or about October

31, 1990, Mr. Lewis filed an Answer and Verified Counter Petition
to Mrs. Robinson's Petition.

On or about January 15, 1993, the

trial court conducted a hearing on the petition and counter
petition, at which time the parties stipulated on the record in
open court to certain modifications of the Decree.

Subsequent to

the hearing, the parties' attorneys exchanged and critiqued
copies of the proposed order regarding the January 15, 1993
hearing.

Mrs. Robinson's counsel requested a copy of the

transcript of the January hearing on March 11, 1993.
2

Mr. Lewis'

counsel submitted an Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce which
was signed and entered by the trial court on March 31, 1993. On
or about April 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel filed an
Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional Time to
Obtain Transcript, which the trial court overruled by an order
entered on the 11th day of February, 1994. Mrs. Robinson's
counsel filed a motion to modify the order nunc pro tunc on or
about April 28, 1993.

The trial court denied Mrs. Robinson's

Motion by Memorandum Decision dated September 13, 1993, which was
never reduced to a signed order.

On or about September 22, 1993,

Mrs. Robinson's counsel made a motion for Rehearing of Motion to
Set Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc.

The trial

court entered an order on the Motion for Rehearing on February
11, 1994, from which this appeal ensues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered

May 2, 1988.
2.
minors.

(Decree of Divorce, May 2, 1988).

The parties have three children, two of which are still
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, May 2, 1988,

paragraph 4 ) .
3.

On or about September 8, 1989, Mrs. Robinson filed a

Petition to Modify Decree.

(Petition to Modify Decree, dated

September 8, 1989) .
4.

On or about October 31, 1990, Mr. Lewis filed an Answer

to Mrs. Robinson's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, which
included a Verified Counter Petition.
3

(Answer to Petition to

Modify Decree of Divorce and Verified Counter Petition, dated
October 31, 1990).
5.

On or about January 15, 1993, the trial court conducted

a hearing on the petition and counter petition, at which time the
parties stipulated on the record in open court to certain
modifications.
6.

(Transcript, January 15, 1993).

The parties7 counsel exchanged and critiqued copies of

the proposed order regarding the January 15, 1993 hearing.
(Affidavit of Brent D. Young, April 25, 1993, paragraphs 2-5).
7.

Mrs. Robinson's counsel requested a copy of the

transcript of the January, 1993 hearing on March 11, 1993.
(Request for Transcript, March 11, 1993).
8.

Mr. Lewis' counsel submitted an Order Modifying Decree

of Divorce which was signed and entered by the trial court on
March 31, 1993.

(Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, March 31,

1993) .
9.

On or about April 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel

filed an Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional
Time to Obtain Transcript.

(Objection to Proposed Order and

Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript, April 22,
1993) .
10.

On or about April 28, 1993, Mrs. Robinson's counsel

made a Motion to Set Aside Order wherein counsel requested the
Order be modified nunc pro tunc "so that the order will
accurately reflect the stipulation which was made on the record."
(Motion to Set Aside Order, April 28, 1993).
4

11.

On or about May 3, 1993, Mrs. Robinson filed a

Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Set Aside or Modify,
comparing the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce to the actual
stipulations recorded in the Transcript of the January 15, 1993
hearing on the decree modification.

(Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Set Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, May
3, 1993) .
12.

In a Memorandum Decision dated May 19, 1993, the trial

court overruled Mrs. Robinson's Objection to Proposed Order and
Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript as untimely
filed and for failure to set forth a justifiable ground for
relief; the Decision was reduced to an order signed on the 11th
day of February, 1994.

(Memorandum Decision, May 19, 1993; Order

on Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order, February 11, 1994).
13.

In a Memorandum Decision dated September 13, 1993, the

trial court denied Mrs. Robinson's Motion to modify the order
nunc pro tunc; the Decision was never reduced to a signed order.
(Memorandum Decision, September 13, 1993).
14.

The trial court's basis for denying the nunc pro tunc

modification request was that the requested changes "are more
than just mere clerical mistakes."

(Memorandum Decision,

September 13, 1993, paragraph 2).
15.

On or about September 22, 1993, Mrs. Robinson made a

Motion for Rehearing of Motion to Set Aside Order of Modify the
Order Nunc Pro Tunc.

(Motion for Rehearing of Motion to Set

Aside Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc, September 22,
5

1993) .
16.

The trial court entered an Order on Plaintiff's Second

Motion to Set Aside Order on February 11, 1994, denying Mrs.
Robinson's Motion on the basis that "good cause" does not exist
under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to allow the court in
its discretion to modify the order nunc pro tunc.

(Order on

Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside Order, February 11, 1994,
paragraph 4 ) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court entered an Order on Plaintiff's Second
Motion to Set Aside Order on February 11, 1994, denying Mrs.
Robinson's Motion on the basis that "good cause" does not exist
under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to allow the court in
its discretion to modify the order nunc pro tunc.
Facts, paragraph 16).

(Statement of

The court quoted language from Bagshaw v.

Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060-61 (Utah App. 1990) in making the
determination that good cause was lacking.

"'The general

principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc . . . are relevant,
if not controlling, in a determination of good cause'"

(Order on

Plaintiff's Second Motion, page 1).
The Bagshaw court determined that a finding of "good cause"
depended upon the type of error from which relief is sought,
whether the requested changes were reflected in the record, and
whether an "obvious injustice" would result if the changes were
not made.

Id. at 1061.

In our case, the requested changes are

reflected in the actual stipulations of the parties as found in
6

the certified transcript of the January, 1993 hearing.
the requested changes, an obvious injustice results.

Without
In effect,

Mr. Lewis has been allowed to unilaterally alter the agreements
reached at the January, 1993 hearing.

Finally, the type of error

presented fits within the common law definition of clerical
error, and this case is factually similar to previous cases in
which a nunc pro tunc modification was permitted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CONCLUDING
THAT THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL TO DRAFT THE
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE TO CONFORM WITH NINE
(9) PARTICULAR AND IDENTIFIABLE STIPULATIONS MADE ON
THE RECORD WAS NOT "GOOD CAUSE" TO ENTER AN ORDER NUNC
PRO TUNC.
Under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l (1989), the trial
court may enter an order nunc pro tunc upon a finding of good
cause.

The Utah Court of Appeals gives the trial court broad

discretion in determining whether such good cause exists.

Home

v. H o m e , 737 P.2d 244, 248 (Utah App. 1987) . The trial court,
however, is not permitted an unbridled exercise of discretion.
Some guidance is given by the case of Bacrshaw v. Bagshaw, 788
P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990), wherein the appellate court
recognized that section 30-4a-l "does not abrogate all the common
law trappings of nunc pro tunc law."

Id. at 1060.

The Bagshaw court determined that a finding of "good cause"
depended upon the type of error from which relief is sought,
whether the requested changes were reflected in the record, and
whether an "obvious injustice" would result if the changes were
7

not made.

Id. at 1061.

In order for Mrs. Robinson to establish

that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion, she "must
first marshall all the evidence that supports the finding and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence the finding is so
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence.'"

Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App.

1992)(quoting Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App.
1992)).

The evidence of record and the "common law trappings" of

nunc pro tunc law demonstrate together that the decision of the
trial court was an abuse of discretion.
A.

THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD SUPPORTS A NUNC PRO TUNC MODIFICATION.
The guiding principle of nunc pro tunc law is that "a nunc

pro tunc order must . . . be entered for the purpose of making
the record reflect what actually was meant to happen at a prior
time."

Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057 (Utah App. 1990).

In

the Bagshaw case, Mr. Bagshaw claimed that a stipulation was made
by the parties, but never entered as an order by the court. Mr.
Bagshaw sought an order nunc pro tunc to correct the situation.
There, the court said that "in determining good cause in our
case, the threshold inquiry is (1) did Husband and Wife clearly
agree that alimony would be terminated in 1973, and (2) was the
court prepared in 1973 to enter an order based upon that
agreement?"

Id. at 1061.

The threshold inquiry in our case is the same.

The

transcript of the January, 1993 hearing evidences the fact that
the parties actually stipulated to certain identifiable
8

modifications to the Decree of Divorce.

The fact that the court

signed the order presented by Mr. Lewis is evidence that the
court was prepared to enter an order based upon the agreements
reached at the January, 1993 hearing.

One issue is whether those

stipulations are adequately covered by the Order Modifying Decree
of Divorce as it stands. The Order does not accurately reflect
what took place at the January, 1993 hearing.

Mrs. Robinson's

counsel filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside
Order or Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc (Memorandum, May 3,
1993), and a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Rehearing
(Memorandum, September 22, 1993).

In both Memoranda, Mrs.

Robinson stated that certain identifiable paragraphs of the Order
Modifying Decree did not reflect the stipulations made at the
January, 1993 hearing.
Paragraph 4.c. of the Order Modifying Decree contains extra
language which was not agreed to in the stipulation on the record
of the January, 1993 hearing.
11

That paragraph states that

[h]olidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and no

changes should be made to the regular rotation of the alternating
weekend schedule."

(Emphasis added).

The parties did agree that

the holiday visitation should take precedence over the regular
weekend visitation.

The parties, however, neither discussed nor

agreed that the regular weekend rotation would stay the same.
The emphasized language was not stipulated to at the hearing.
The transcript reads:
Mr. West: We would ask for a couple [of]
modifications on visitations on the holidays. For
9

example, if we have one on a Monday - if a holiday is
on a long weekend, either Friday or Monday, whoever has
that holiday should have the children for that entire
weekend, for the three day weekend. That just makes
sense to me instead of having one party split up a
weekend. And that holiday should take precedence over
regular visitation. Some years that will work out to
my client's benefit, some years to Mr. Young's client's
benefit.
Mr. Young: That's agreeable.
The Court: All right.
(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 3, lines 13-24).
The parties agreed to allow the holiday visitation to take
precedence over the regular weekend vitiation.

The agreement did

not state that the regular weekend schedule would be unaffected.
Mr. Lewis could just as easily drafted paragraph 4.c. to read
that the parties may negotiate changes in the regular weekend
rotation.

That is another possible result of the agreement

reached.

Since neither was part of the explicit agreement,

neither should be included in the Order.

The Order Modifying

Decree should be changed nunc pro tunc to delete the emphasized
language in order to accurately reflect the record.
Another paragraph similarly contains language that was not
part of the recorded stipulation.

Paragraph 4.1. states:

"[e]ach parent shall be allowed two weeks per year uninterrupted
possession of the children for purposes of vacation, provided the
same does not interfere with holiday visitation per above.

Each

parent shall notify the other in writing of such two week period
at least 30 days in advance."

(Emphasis added).

In the

transcript, this provision was discussed.
Mr. Young: One of the problems we've had in the
past -- and I'm sure because of Mr. Lewis's attitude
10

here today that he wouldn't object, but I would like to
have it in the order --is the every other weekend
visitation has been -- this is a long time ago. I sure
he wouldn't do it again -- has been used to stop her
from having any kind of extended visitation --or
extended vacation with Cammeron and the rest of the
family because he's had every other week. Now, to the
extent she might want to go on a week or two week
vacation, if she gives him notice 30 days in advance,
she would like to do that.
Ms. Robinson: I'll make it mutual.
Mr. West: How about we make it each of you are
entitled to -- mutually entitled to two weeks extended
visitation -Mr. Lewis: I've never tried to antagonize her
visitation Mr. Young.
The Court: Let's have a provision that each of
the parties have an uninterrupted two week vacation,
during which visitation will be suspended during that
visitation.
(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 15, lines 12-25, page
16, lines 1-7).
As shown by the transcript, the parties did agree to two weeks of
uninterrupted summer visitation.

The parties also agreed to

provide thirty days notice for the two week vacation.

Mr. Lewis'

Order adds that the two week visitation cannot take place over a
holiday and that the thirty day notice must be in writing.

Both

terms are restrictive and neither was agreed upon or even
discussed at the January, 1993 hearing.

A nunc pro tunc

modification is necessary to allow the two week visitation to
take place over a holiday and to permit oral as well as written
notice.
Paragraph 4.k. states: l![t]he Defendant is entitled to six
weeks summer visitation if the minor child is in a traditional
school.

If the child goes to a year round school, the Defendant

is still entitled to six weeks extended visitation, but not to
11

interfere with the child's schooling.
Plaintiff 3 0 days."

Defendant shall give

The natural reading of this paragraph

permits Mr. Lewis to request six continuous weeks of summer
vacation.

A different result was contemplated in the record.

Mr. West: Currently Mr. Lewis has again this year
-- under the order he gets the children for five weeks
during the summer, and we would ask that that be
increased maybe one more week to six weeks, about half
the vacation. Also, there isn't a set breakdown on
when to take the kids. I think they've been able to
work that out. So I don't think we need to say two
week periods or four weeks. I think they can work that
out. And we would ask you to agree to six weeks in the
summer.
Ms. Robinson: That's fine.
The Court: Okay.
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 7, lines 7-17) .
According to the transcript, the parties contemplated that the
six week visitation would be divided into two and four week
periods.

At the very least, the Order should have recognized

that the parties would work out the arrangements of dividing the
six week visitation.

A nunc pro tunc modification will correct

the order to reflect that arrangement that the six week
visitation will be divided by agreement of the parties.
Paragraph 4.s. of the Order is also in error.

It states:

fl

[t]he Defendant may attend Parent-Teacher conference, but he

shall coordinate with Plaintiff so that they go at different
times."

The parties' agreement was more explicit.

Mr. West: As a noncustodial parent for the last
13 years, I've never missed a parent teacher
conference. Some have a civil enough relationship to
go with the other parent. I don't. I go one night and
she goes the other night.
The Court: I don't want them there creating havoc
at the school. I think he's entitled to know and to
12

attend. But I think they ought to cooperate in knowing
when they're going so they don't go at the same time.
Mr. Young: Okay.
Ms. Robinson: That's fine.
Mr. West: I'm sorry.
The Court: She'll inform him of the parent
teacher conferences and they will go at different
times. She'll tell him when she's going and he'll have
to go the other time, whatever it is.
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 12, lines 24-25, page 13, lines
1-15) .
The stipulation in the transcript favored Mrs. Robinson.

She is

to inform Mr. Lewis of the time she is going, and Mr. Lewis is to
go the other available time.

Reading the emphasized language in

the Order, Mr. Lewis does not have to accept the direction of
Mrs. Robinson.

The Order should be changed to mirror the

agreement made at the January, 1993 hearing that Mrs. Robinson is
to inform Mr. Lewis of the time she is going, and Mr. Lewis is to
go the other available time.
Paragraph 4.x. of the Order also contains less than was
agreed upon in open court.

Paragraph 4.x. says:

fl

[a] child will

be excused from visitation if he or she is ill, in which case
there will be a make-up visitation the following weekend."

That

was the particular situation suggested by Mr. Lewis' counsel.
The court expanded the excuse from visitation.
Mr. West: I guess the other issue is if for
instance Cammeron could not go with his Dad because of
illness it could be made up the following weekend.
The Court: Any problem with that?
Ms. Robinson: No.
The Court: Okay. I don't think I would limit it
to illness. There maybe [sic] other things. Cammeron
wants to go visit but maybe he has a Cub Scout meeting.
He's going to -- and would rather do that and have
visitation another night. And so -- or that time -13

Mr. Lewis: Are we talking weekends or just
Wednesday, [sic]
The Court: I'm talking right now Wednesday. I
hope the parties will learn to be flexible about those
things. The older the boy becomes the more independent
he is going to become in regards to whether he does or
doesn't visit. And whether Father likes it or not,
he's going to find that some of the things that Boy
wants to do are going to take precedent over what Dad
wants to do. And that's something that a custodial
parent lives with all the time, and the noncustodial
parents have to live with it all the time, too.
Mr. West: I guess it's also standard, other
visitation mutually agreed upon?
Ms. Robinson: Sure.
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 10, lines 5-25, page 11, lines
1-4) .
Although the parties agreed that excuse from visitation would be
more broad than the original suggestion of only in case of
sickness, Mr. Lewis failed to include the actual agreement in the
Order.

The Order and the agreement shown by the record do not

match.

Paragraph 4.x. should be amended to permit the child to

be excused from visitation "if he or she is ill, or has some
activity which the child would prefer to attend, which conflicts
with the visitation."
Paragraphs 4.e. and 4.f. of the Order are also in error.
Paragraph 4.e. states: [i]n even numbered years (1992, 1994,
1996, etc.) the Defendant is to have Thanksgiving.

Thanksgiving

holiday is Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m."

Paragraph

4.f. states: [i]n odd numbered years (1993, 1995, 1997, etc.) the
Defendant is to have Easter.
until Sunday 6:00 p.m.

Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 p.m.

The "even-odd" year arrangement was never

agreed to at the January, 1993 hearing.
14

The transcript

discussion regarding Thanksgiving and Easter was much more
limited.
Mr. West: We would propose that Thanksgiving
visitation be from Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday
6:00 p.m., and that one year, whoever has Thanksgiving,
the other gets the Easter vacation. This year it was a
four day holiday, at least with my children. The one
party gets them for Thanksgiving and the other for
Spring Break.
Ms. Robinson:

That's fine.

(Transcript, January, 1993, page 3, line 25, page 4, lines 1-7).
The inclusion of the "odd-even" arrangement is representative Of
Mr. Lewis' continued efforts to exert control over the lives of
Mrs. Robinson and her children.

The "odd-even" provision

relating to Thanksgiving and Easter should be stricken from the
Order.

The parties did not decide who would get which year. Mr.

Lewis assigned his own opinion to the matter.
Paragraph 4.g. reflects a similar "odd-even" arrangement
which was not agreed to by stipulation at the hearing, either.
That paragraph reads, in part: [i]n even numbered years the
Defendant shall have Christmas visitation from the day the minor
child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m."

The

discussion regarding Christmas visitation was limited to how the
actual school holiday was to be split between the parties.
(Transcript, January, 1993, page 4, lines 8-25, page 5, page 6,
lines 1-4)(Excerpt attached in Appendix).

The Order as it stands

gives Mr. Lewis both the Thanksgiving holiday and Christmas Eve
and Christmas morning in the same year.

Such an arrangement does

not reflect the spirit of compromise evidenced by the
stipulations reached by the parties.
15

Finally, paragraph 4.p. is not consistent with the agreement
of the parties at the January, 1993 hearing.

Paragraph 4.p.

states: "Defendant to have visitation every Wednesday for three
hours.

The Defendant shall bring the child back no later than

8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiff's approval during the school
year.

During school vacation and breaks the Defendant may bring

back the child later than 8:00 p.m."

The parties' agreement

contemplated bringing the child back later than 8:00 p.m. during
summer vacation or its equivalent in a year-round school.

The

record reads:
The Court: Why don't we have it that it's three
hours, but not later than 8:00 without her approval.
And if it's a special event like a Jazz game or
something -Mr. Young: Or except in the summer.
Ms. Robinson: Yeah, in the summer he can stay.
The Court: During the school time, that it not be
later than 8:00 without Mrs. Robinson's approval. In
the summer it won't apply. Just in the school time.
Mr. Young: Make it school time, because maybe
they're going to have year round school.
The Court:

Yeah, that's a good idea.

(Transcript of January, 1993 hearing, page 9, lines 4-16).
According to the Order as it stands, Mr. Lewis can keep his child
out past 8:00 p.m. without Mrs. Robinson's approval not only
during summer vacation, but during any school break.

That was

not the intention of the parties, evidenced by the discussion
just quoted.

The Order Modifying Decree should be changed to

reflect what the parties decided at the hearing.

Paragraph 4.p.

should be corrected to read: "Defendant is to have visitation
every Wednesday for three hours.

The Defendant shall bring the

child back no later than 8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiff's
16

approval during the school year.

During school summer vacation,

or its equivalent in year round school, the Defendant may bring
the child back later than 8:00 p.m."
An obvious injustice will result if the foregoing changes
are not made.

The identified paragraphs show that Mr. Lewis,

through his counsel, altered each agreement reached at the
January, 1993 hearing.

Some of the alterations are subtle and

may seem of little consequence to this court.

All of the

alterations, however, are of significant consequence to Mrs.
Robinson.

In the past, Mr. Lewis used the visitation terms to

antagonize Mrs. Robinson.

In open court on January 15, 1993, the

parties reached difficult and long sought compromises.

Mr. Lewis

again sought to antagonize and control Mrs. Robinson by subtly
altering those agreements.

It is inequitable to permit one party

to unilaterally alter an agreement reached in open court.

The

judge signed the Order which Mr. Lewis presented as a reflection
of the parties' agreement.

The certified transcript shows that

the Order does not reflect what actually happened at the January,
1993 hearing.
B.

THE COMMON LAW SUPPORTS A NUNC PRO TUNC MODIFICATION.
"While section 30-4a-l has a broad remedial scope, it does

not abrogate all the common law trappings of nunc pro tunc law."
Bacrshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) . In our
case, the errors must be of the type which the common law
recognizes as errors to which a nunc pro tunc modification
applies.

Even though the trial court was presented with nine
17

identifiable errors in the Order Modifying Decree, the court
denied Mrs. Robinson's efforts to obtain a nunc pro tunc
modification.

The denial was based on the trial court's belief

that the errors were not of a type to which a nunc pro tunc
modification applies.

In its Memorandum Decision on the original

motion to set aside the order or change the order nunc pro tunc,
the trial court denied the motion, stating that the requested
changes "are more than just mere clerical mistakes."
of Facts, paragraph 14).

(Statement

In the Order on Mrs. Robinson's second

motion to set aside or modify the order nunc pro tunc, from which
this appeal arises, the court found good cause lacking.
(Statement of Facts, paragraph 16).

Although the court gave no

specific reason for not finding good cause, the trial court
referred to the general principles of common law nunc pro tunc
modifications.

(Order on Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside

Order, February 11, 1994, page 1).

In both findings, the common

law clearly supports Mrs. Robinson's request for a nunc pro tunc
modification.
At the common law, nunc pro tunc modifications are generally
available when some clerical error occurs.

Diehl Lumber Transp.,

Inc. v. Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739, 742 (Utah App. 1990) . Utah
courts have often defined clerical error.

"The distinction

between a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend
upon who made it.

Rather, it depends on whether it was made in

rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered."
Richards v. Siddoway. 471 P.2d 143, 145 (Utah 1970).
18

In our

case, the error was clerical error.

The error was in recording

what occurred at the January, 1993 hearing.

The judge signed an

order which was presented to him as the summation of the parties'
agreements in open court.

The certified transcript shows that

the order presented by Mr. Lewis did not accurately reflect what
occurred at the hearing.
Our case is similar to the case of Meagher v. Equity Oil
Co., 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956).

There, the court signed an order

prepared by the counsel of one of the parties.
match what happened at the trial.
court to correct the order.

The order did not

The other party petitioned the

The Utah Supreme Court held in favor

of correcting the order.
"This act did not reflect [the judge's] judgment, and,
therefore, does not represent an error in judgment on
his part. It was a mistake of a perfunctory or
clerical nature apparently resulting from an erroneous
assumption that the order as prepared by counsel
correctly reflected the judgment of this and the lower
court."
Id. at 830.
The certified transcript in our case shows that the order
signed by the trial court differs from the stipulations reached
by the parties in open court.

The signing of the order does not

represent an error in judgment by the trial court.

Much like the

trial court in Meagher, the court in our case was presented an
order by Mr. Lewis' counsel.

The judge signed the order under

the assumption that the order accurately reflected what occurred
at the January, 1993 hearing.

The error was in recording the

judgment, not in rendering the judgment.
19

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Robinson presented the trial court with nine
identifiable instances in which the Order Modifying Decree did
not match the agreements reached at trial. Although these
differences may seem of little consequence to the court, they are
of significant consequence to the appellant Mrs. Robinson.

This

type of error is that which is subject to nunc pro tunc
modification under the common law.

To permit Mr. Lewis to

unilaterally and subtly alter the agreements is an obvious
injustice.

The trial court had adequate good cause under Utah

Code Annotated Section 30-4a-l to modify the order, but did not.
Based on the foregoing, appellant Ann F. Lewis, nka Ann Robinson
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order on
Plaintiff's Second Motion to Set Aside Order, entered February
11, 1994 and order the district court to enter an order:
(1) modifying the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce nunc pro
tunc to accurately reflect the stipulations of the parties as
evidenced by the record of the January 15, 1993 hearing.
Dated this

day of

. 1994.

BRENT D. Y0UN9
robnsn.brf
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this /J day of
1994, I caused to be mailed four true and correcz copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant Ann F. Lewis, nka Ann Robinson, to
Greg Ross Lewis, Defendant/Appellee, postage prepaid, addressed
as follows:
GREG ROSS LEWIS
461 N. 800 West
Lindon, UT 84042

BRENT
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APPENDIX

1

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15, 1993.

2

ANN ROBINSON VERSUS GREG LEWIS

3

THE COURT:

4
5
6

THE CASE OF LEWIS VERSUS LEWIS. AND MR. YOUNG?
MR. YOUNG:

YOUR HONOR, THE RECORD SHOULD

REFLECT TEAT COUNSEL -- CAN YOU SEE ALL RIGHT?

7

MR. WEST:

8

MR. YOUNG:

9

THIS IS CASE NUMBER 874401013,

I CAN HEAR, THAT'S THE MAIN THING.
—

WE HAD A MEETING IN CHAMBERS.

WE DISCUSSED THE EVALUATION, CUSTODY EVALUATION THAT WAS

10

FILED SOMETIME AGO.

AND I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE

11

PRETRIAL ORDER FILED SO THE RECORD IS COMPLETE WITH

12

RESPECT TO WHAT THE ISSUES WOULD HAVE BEEN.

13

WOULD, BASED UPON WHAT THE COURT TOLD US IN CHAMBERS, I

14

THINK IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA RATHER THAN JUST CONDUCT

15

THIS AS A TRIAL, IF I WERE TO ADDRESS EACH ISSUE THAT IS

16

SET FORTE IN THE PRETRIAL ORDER, I THINK THIS CASE WILL

17

EVAPORATE, AT LEAST THE BETTER PART OF IT WILL EVAPORATE

18

RATHER QUICKLY.

AND THEN I

MAY I DO THAT?

19

THE COURT:

YOU MAY.

20

MR. YOUNG:

THE VISITATION -- THERE ARE THREE

21

CHILDREN AND WE'VE TALKED ABOUT THE VISITATION AND MY

22

CLIENT IS AGREEABLE TO ALMOST ANY SCHEDULE OF VISITATION

23

FOR THE MINOR CHILD CAMMERON WHO IS ABOUT S.

24

UNDERSTAND VISITATION HAS NOT BEEN A PROBLEM FOR ABOUT A

25

YEAR -- OR HOW LONG?

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

AND I

1

VISITATION BE FROM WEDNESDAY 6:00 P.M. UNTIL SUNDAY 6:00

2

P.M., AND THAT ONE YEAR, WHOEVER HAS THANKSGIVING, THE

3

OTHER GETS THE EASTER VACATION.

4

DAY HOLIDAY, AT LEAST WITH MY CHILDREN.

5

GETS THEM FOR THANKSGIVING AND THE OTHER FOR SPRING

6

BREAK.

7

MS. ROBINSON:

8

MR. WEST:

9

THIS YEAR IT WAS A FOUR
THE ONE PARTY

THAT'S FINE.

I BELIEVE CHRISTMAS VISITATION IS

SET UP ALL RIGHT THE WAY IT IS.

THAT IS THEY ALTERNATE

10

-- BASICALLY THEY SPLIT THE CHRISTMAS VACATION IN HALF.

11

ONE YEAR THE ONE PARTY GETS THE FIRST HALF OF CHRISTMAS

12

VACATION, AND THEN THE NEXT GETS THE LEFTOVER AMOUNT OF

13

TIME AFTER THAT, BECAUSE THEY'RE OUT OF SCHOOL.

14
15
16
17
18

THE COURT:

USUALLY THE ONE AT THE BEGINNING

GETS A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME.
MR. LEWIS:

LIKE THIS YEAR I HAD THREE DAYS,

WHICH DIDN'T MAKE IT REALLY TOG FAIR.
MR. WEST:

WHAT I'M SAYING, IS FOR INSTANCE

19

THIS YEAR, SAY AS AN EXAMFLE MR. LEWIS —

SAY IF IT WAS

20

HIS TURN TO HAVE THEM AT THE FIRST OF CHRISTMAS VACATION

21

AND IT WAS THREE DAYS THEY WERE OUT OF SCHOOL, TAKE THE

22

THREE DAYS AND THEY'RE OUT OF SCHOOL 14 DAYS, HE'S

23

ENTITLED TO FOUR MORE DAYS LATER AND SO IT BALANCES OUT

24

THAT HE'LL HAVE SEVEN DAYS.

25

UNDERSTANDS WHAT I'M SAYING.

I THINK EVERYBODY

CREED K. BARKER, CSR

1

THE COURT:

I THINK SO.

AND EITHER WAY IS

2

FAIR.

MY' STANDARD ORDER, AND WHAT THEY'RE PROPOSING IS

3

ACCEPTABLE TO THE COURT.

4

DIVIDED AT NOON OR 2 O'CLOCK ON CHRISTMAS DAY.

5

DON'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ANY ADDITIONAL TIME.

6

REASON THAT TURNS OUT TO BE FAIR IS THE NEXT YEAR THE ONE

7

THAT GOT THE SHORT —

8

PORTION OF VACATION GETS CHRISTMAS EVE AND CHRISTMAS

9

MORNING.

MY STANDARD ORDER IS IT'S

AND THEN THE NEXT YEAR THEY WILL GET A LONGER

AMOUNT OF VACATION.

11

OR CHRISTMAS MORNING.

12

BUT I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR PROPOSAL.

14

AND THE

WELL THE ONE THAT GETS THE SHORT

10

13

AND I

BUT THEY DON'T GET THE CHRISTMAS EVE

MR. YOUNG:

THAT'S HOW I STANDARDLY DO IT.

WE LIKE THE ONE THE COURT IS

TALKING ABOUT, BUT WE'LL AGREE.

15

MR. LEWIS:

MY SON WANTS MORE TIME WITH ME.

16

HE'S EXPRESSED THAT MANY TIMES.

17

CHRISTMASTIME OF. OTHER TIMES OF THE YEAR HE WANTS MORE

18

TIME WITH ME.

19

MF. WEST:

20

THE COURT:

WHETHER IT'S

WE'LL GET TO THAT.
BUT THIS -- WE NEED TO MAKE A

21

DETERMINATION ON THE CHRISTMAS VACATION.

22

THAT WAY, COUNSEL, AS YOU'VE PROPOSED, I DON'T OBJECT TO

23

IT.

24

MR. WEST:

25

MR. YOUNG:

IF YOU WANT IT

DO YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT I'VE SAID?
WILL YOU PUT IT IN WRITING?

CREED H. BARKER, CSP.

b

1
2

MR. WEST:

I'LL SEE IF I CAN STRAIGHTEN OUT

WHAT I SAID IN WRITING, YES.

3

THE COURT:

4

AND THAT'S ACCEPTABLE.

5

MR. WEST:

I THINK WE UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT

CURRENTLY MY CLIENT, UNDER THE

6

DIVORCE DECREE, IS ENTITLED TO TWO PHONE CALLS A WEEK ON

7

CERTAIN DAYS.

8

LIKE TO MAKE THAT REASONABLE PHONE CALLS.

9

MR. YOUNG:

10
11

I DON'T RECALL THE DAYS.

MR. WEST:

WE WOULD JUST

THAT'S FINE.
IF THAT IS RIGHT -- YOU MIGHT CALL

FOUR OR FIVE TIMES IN A WEEK, RATHER THAN JUST TWO.

12

MR. LEWIS:

WHAT I WANT TO DO IS ACCOMPLISH

13

THINGS PEACEFULLY, SO THINGS ARE MADE SO WE DON'T HAVE TO

14

BE RIGID ON ANYTHING;

15

BACK AND FORTH.

16

DOESN'T HAVE TO BE HOME AT A CERTAIN TIME TC TAKE THE

17

PHONE CALL.

18
19
20
21

WE HAVE A FREE RELATIONSHIP GOING

CALLS CAN BE MADE FREELY.

THE COURT:

SOMEBODY

I THINK THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT

HOWEVER AS TO THE HOUR AFTER WHICH THE CALLS CAN BE MADE.
MP. WEST:

WE'RE SAYING REASONABLE CALLS AT

REASONABLE TIMES.

22

MR. YOUNG:

GENERALLY BEFORE 8:00.

23

THE COURT:

LET'S HAVE IT BEFORE 8:00.

24
25

I

THINK THAT'S APPROPRIATE.
MR. WEST:

AND ALSO CAMMERON OR THE GIRLS CAN

CREED H. BARKER, CSR

Orson B. West, Jr. U166
Attorney for Defendant
669 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5951
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANN F. LEWIS, nka,
ANN ROBINSON
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil No. CV 87 1013

GREG ROSS LEWIS

)

Judge Ray M. Harding

Defendant.

ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

The above-entitled matter came on before the Court for hearing on January 15, 1993. The
Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Brent D. Young. The
.Defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Orson B. West, Jr. The
Court having heard proffers from counsel, sworn testimony, and the parties having stipulated
to some.matters, and being otherwise fullly advised in the premises, now, therefore, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED OR DECREED:
1. That the Defendant may retain a qualified licensed independent therapist for the purpose
of attempting to resolve issues that have developed between the Defendant and his daughters.
2. The Plaintiff is ordered to cooperate with the therapist as recommended by the therapist.
3. The Defendant is responsible for all costs of therapy not covered by insurance.
4. The Defendant shall be entitled to the following visitation:
a. Every other weekend from Friday 5:00 p.m. until Sunday 8:00 p.m.
b. Every other holiday, said holidays being defined as follows: New Years' Day, Martin
Luther King Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July 4th, July 24th, Labor Day, Veterens'
Day, Thanksgiving Day; the non-custodial parent to have visitation beginning 6:00 p.m. the
day before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the holiday;
c. Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation and no changes should be made
to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend schedule;
d. If said holiday falls on a three day weekend, then whichever party is entitled to have
the children on that holiday shall have the children the entire weekend;
e. In even numbered years (1992, 1994, 1996, etc.) the Defendant is to have
Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving holiday is Wednesday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m.;

f. In odd numbered years (1993, 1995, 1997, etc.) the Defendant is to have Easter.
Easter holiday is Friday 6:00 p.m. until Sunday 6:00 p.m.
g. In even numbered years the Defendant shall have Christmas visitation from the day
the minor child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. The Plaintiff shall have the
Christmas visitation from Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. and the same number of days after
Christmas that Defendant had prior to Christmas Day. Any remaining days of Christmas
vacation shall be divided equally between the parties. In odd numbered years the parties
shall reverse visitation, with the Plaintiff having Christmas visitation from the day the minor
child is out of school until Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. The Defendant shall have the
Christmas visitation from Christmas Day 2:00 p.m. and the same number of days after
Christmas that the Plaintiff had prior to Christmas Day. Any remaining days of Christmas
vacation shall be divided equally between the parties.
h. Each party is entitled to reasonable telephone visitation with the parties' minor
children generally before 8:00 p.m.
i. The telephone visitation shall be without interference or monitoring by the other party
or anyone else;
j. The children should be allowed to freely call the other parent during periods of
visitation.
k. The Defendant is entitled to six weeks summer visitation if the minor child is in a
traditional school. If the child goes to a year-round school, the Defendant is still entitled to
six weeks extended visitation, but not to interfere with the child's schooling. Defendant
shall give Plaintiff 30 days.
1. Each parent shall be allowed two weeks per year uninterrupted possession of the
children for purposes of vacation, provided the same does not interfere with holiday
visitation per above. Each parent shall notify the other in writing of such two week period
at least 30 days in advance.
m. If Defendant exercises his summer visitation in periods of two weeks or longer, then
Plaintiff shall have reciprocal visitation that is provided to Defendant.
n. Father's Day and Mother's Day as appropriate, 6:00 p.m. the day before until 6:00
p.m. the day of;
o. Defendant's birthday, Plaintiff to have her birthday.
p. Defendant to have visitation every Wednesday for three hours. The Defendant shall
bring the child back no later than 8:00 p.m. without the Plaintiffs approval during the
school year. During school vacation and breaks the Defendant may bring back the child later
than 8:00 p.m.
q. Any other visitation the parties mutually agree upon.
r. The Plaintiff shall keep Defendant informed of the children's extra-curricular activities
such as church, scouting, little league, school, etc.

s. The Defendant may attend Parent-Teacher conference, but he shall coordinate with
Plaintiff so that they go at different times.
t. Any missed visitation shall be made up as soon as possible.
u. The Plaintiff shall inform Defendant of any health concerns of the children.
v. The parties shall not use the children as messengers, but shall discuss visitation and
other appropriate issues directly with each other.
w. All visitation shall be exercised in a prompt manner so that both parties may rely on
the schedule outlined above in making plans. The non-custodial parent will pick-up the
children from the front of the Plaintiff's residence no earlier than 15 minutes prior and no
later than 15 minutes after the appointed hour, and shall return the children no later than 15
minutes after the appointed hour.
x. A child will be excused from visitation if he or she is ill, in which case there will be a
make-up visitation the following weekend.
y. It is fair and reasonable that the base child support is reduced by 50% for each child
and for time periods during which specific extended visitation of the child with the noncustodial parent is granted in the order far at least 25 of any consecutive 30 days.
z. Each party shall maintain health insurance if available through their places of
employment.
aa. The parties shall exchange insurance carrier information and cooperate in filing
/claims with the insurance companies.
bb. Each party shall give to the other party a copy of any medical bills within seven
days of receipt of said bill.
5. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant for one-half if unreimbursed medical
expenses in the sum of $474.59, provided Plaintiff provide Defendant with an itemized
breakdown of such costs within 30 days of the date of the trial, to be paid upon receiving his
severance pay.
6. Based upon the parties' relative need and ability to pay, the Court is satisfied that each
party should pay their own attorney's fees.
The Court is satisfied that both parties, especially the Plaintiff, now understands the
importance of visitation and will cooperate is seeing that it is accomplished to the fullesat
extent possible.
DATED this
day of March, 1993.
Honorable Ray M. Harding
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
Brent D. Young
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANN F. LEWIS, nka ANN ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 874401013
DATE: September 13, 1993

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
GREG ROSS LEWIS,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Joe Morton
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiffs motion titled Motion to Set
Aside Order which asked the court to modify the order nunc pro tunc. Having reviewed the
Motion and casefile, the Court hereby denies the Motion.
On May 19th, 1993, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision overruling Plaintiffs
earlier Objection to Proposed Order and Request for Additional Time to Obtain Transcript
finding the Plaintiffs objection untimely. The objection was based on the allegation that the
language in the modification to the Decree of Divorce was materially different from that
agreed to in the stipulation it was based on. The motion to modify the order nunc pro tunc
seeks to change the same language. These changes are more than just mere clerical
mistakes. Counsel's letters point out the sharp differences of opinion in what each believed
the order of the Court was. As such, an amendment nunc pro tunc is inappropriate.
Plaintiff has waived her right to object to the modification as submitted by not
objecting in a timely manner. The modification stands as ordered.
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this 13th day of September, 1993.

cc:

Brent D. Young, Esq.
Orson B. West, Esq.

Orson B. West, Jr. #4166
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West Ste. 215
Mm
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANN F. LEWIS, NKA ANN,
ROBINSON
Plaintiff,
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\
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ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION TO
SET ASIDE ORDER

]i

Civil No. 874401013

1

Judge Ray M. Harding

,.v

ie & Young

vs.
GREG ROSS LEWIS,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing of Motion to
Set Aside Order to Modify the Order Nunc Pro Tunc. Having reviewed the motion and casefile,
the Court hereby denies the motion.
On September 13, 1993, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision refusing to grant
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order. This motion has asked the court to modify its previous
order nunc pro tunc. Plaintiff now asks the Court to reconsider.
Utah Code Annotated 30-4a-l allows the court, in its "broad discretion,,/ to enter orders
nunc pro tunc in domestic matters when "good cause" is shown. Bagshaw vs. Bagshaw, 788 P.
2d 1057, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), Home vs. H o m e , 737 P. 2d 244, 248 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). "Good cause" is to be found in the "surrounding circumstances, as justice and equity and
justice require." Id. " The general principles of the common law of nunc pro tunc", such as
whether the mistake was attributable to the court as opposed to being attributable to the
parties, "are relevant, if not controlling, in a determination of good cause." Bagshaw at 1060-61.
This Court entered an Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce on March 31,1993. Plaintiffs
counsel did not object to the modification or request an extension of time to make an objection.
On April 22, 1993, Plaintiffs counsel did file and objection and it was overruled. The Court
was not persuaded then, or now, with the argument that the untimely objection should be
allowed because the Plaintiff was awaiting an otficial copy of the hearing transcript. The
Plaintiff had a copy of the reporters computer assisted transcript and if more time were needed
for the official transcript, a timely request for such should have been made.

1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order is denied.
2. The modifications of the Decree of Divorce entered on or about March 31,1993 stands as
ordered.

DATED this

/ /

day of January, 1994.

Mlorable Ray M. Harding

Honoi
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Brent D. Young
Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be faxed and mailed
on this-ti_ day of January, 1994 to:
Brent D. Young
IVIE AND YOUNG
Attorneys at Law
48 North University Ave.
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
FAX# 375-3067
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Cite as 788 ?2d 1057 (UtahApp. 1990)

to pay these fees would be an appropriate
sanction—indeed, not to so require under
those circumstances might be an abuse of
discretion—regardless of whether plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on the claim in
connection with which the discovery was
sought. But again, our record is deficient
It contains nothing to suggest the master
was appointed in response to a motion to
compel discovery nor does it otherwise enlighten us as to the circumstances of the
master's appointment. Accordingly, the
trial court's treatment of this issue cannot
be disturbed.
Finally, I note that I do not regard the
legal issues raised in this appeal to be
frivolous. The difficulty with this appeal is
that plaintiffs did not provide us with a
record adequate to allow us to meaningfully consider the merit of the issues raised.
I join in the court's judgment of affirmance.
fO

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

Wanda Marie Sackett BAGSHAW,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Joseph Arthur BAGSHAW, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 880647-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 8, 1990.
Former wife filed order to show cause
seeking judgment for alimony arrearages.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered judgment
for former wife and former husband appealed. Former wife cross-appealed requesting attorney fees incurred on appeal.
The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held
that: (1) "good cause" did not exist to
order termination of former wife's alimony
under domestic nunc pro tunc statute; (2)

former wife was not estopped from collecting alimony arrearages despite 15-year delay in enforcing alimony order; and (3)
former wife was not entitled to attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
Affirmed.

1. Stipulations $=»6, 7
Reliance on Code of Judicial Administration Rule that requires stipulations to be
in writing or amended in open court to be
enforceable was misplaced where nothing
in record established that rule was in effect
at time of putative stipulation. Judicial
Administration Rule 4-504(8).
2. Courts <3=>85(1)
Court will not apply amended rule of
procedure if it impairs the rights of a party.
3. Divorce e=>162
In marital law area, courts may enter
orders nunc pro tunc upon showing of good
cause. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l.
4. Divorce <s=>247
Domestic nunc pro tunc statute was
specific statute intended to cover situation
where husband requested that trial court
enter order nunc pro tunc to enforce alleged prior oral agreement of parties that
alimony would terminate, not the more general procedural rule on written stipulations.
U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l; Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(8).
5. Appeal and Error <3=>854(1)
Appellate court may affirm trial
court's decision if it can be sustained on
any proper legal basis.
6. Divorce <3=>162
Decision whether to enter nunc pro
tunc order in domestic proceeding is equitable one. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l.
7. Divorce e=*162
Although statutory provision governing nunc pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings has broad remedial scope, it does
not abrogate ali common-law trappings of
nunc pro tunc law. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l.
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8. Motions <e=»56(2)
At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed
court to correct its earlier error or supply
its omission so record accurately reflected
that which had in fact taken place.
9. Judgment <3=>273(5), 326
Courts have traditionally applied nunc
pro tunc doctrine in cases where one of the
parties died after submission of case to
court for decision, but before actual rendition of judgment and where judgment was
rendered by lower court, but clerk failed to
perform ministerial function of entry.
10. Divorce <3=>162
General common-law principles of nunc
pro tunc are relevant, if not controlling, in
determination of good cause under statutory provision governing nunc pro tunc orders in domestic proceeding. U.C.A.1953,
30-4a-l.
11. Divorce ®=>247
Fact that court never received written
stipulation mentioned in minute entry could
alone support finding of lack of "good
cause" and court's refusal to enter order
nunc pro tunc to enforce alleged prior oral
agreement of former husband and wife
that alimony would terminate. U.C.A.1953,
30-4a-l.
12. Divorce «=>247
"Good cause" required for entry of
nunc pro tunc order was not present wherfe
the parties did not enter into enforceable
stipulation to modify decree of divorce to
terminate alimony by former husband to
former wife and there was no termination
of alimony by reason of actions of former
wife.
13. Divorce <3»277
Former wife was not estopped from
collecting alimony arrearages where she
did not unlawfully cohabitate after entry of
divorce decree and did not otherwise engage in actions which would provide basis
for termination of alimony, notwithstanding fact that she waited 15 years before
attempting to collect arrearages.

14. Costs <3=>252
Court of Appeals may order either party to pay attorney fees and this includes
fees incurred on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 30-33.
15. Divorce <3=>288
Former wife was not entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal where she
failed to challenge court's denial of attorney fees below, failed to assert on appeal
any facts in addition to those presented to
trial court concerning her financial need,
did not claim her situation had deteriorated
since trial, and was awarded substantial
judgment for arrearages which could be
used to satisfy fees.
Randall T. Gaither, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
John Spencer Snow, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and
BILLINGS, JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Joseph Arthur Bagshaw
("Husband"), appeals the trial court's order
awarding respondent, Wanda Marie Sackett Bagshaw ("Wife"), $19,400 in alimony
arrearages owing under a divorce decree
entered on January 10, 1973. We affirm.
Wife filed a complaint for divorce seeking $100 per month in support for each of
the couple's two children and $200 per
month in alimony. Husband, unrepresented by counsel, agreed that a default
divorce could be entered against him on
Wife's complaint. Husband now claims he
cannot read and he signed the divorce papers based on Wife's alleged representations that she wanted only child support
and some furniture.
A divorce decree was entered on January
10, 1973, which included the amounts of
child support and alimony requested in the
complaint. After the divorce, Husband
learned of the alimony provision and filed
an Order to Show Cause seeking modification of the decree to terminate the alimony
award. The matter was set for hearing on
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November 28, 1973. On the day of the
scheduled hearing, Husband, his second
wife, and his attorney met with Wife's attorney to discuss the case. Wife was not
present because of threats made to her by
Husband. Husband contends that at this
meeting, Wife, through a telephone conversation with her attorney, agreed to the
termination of alimony. Wife contends she
never agreed to a termination of alimony.
Neither attorney who participated in this
meeting has any recollection of the events.
A minute entry reflected that a stipulation was reached between the parties and
the matter was continued pending a written stipulation and order. However, no
stipulation was ever entered into the
record. Husband asserts he thought the
issue was resolved even though he requested a copy of the papers and admits he
never received those papers.
From November 28, 1973, to February
25, 1988, Wife did not seek to enforce the
alimony order. Because she was on public
assistance, Wife had assigned her right to
payments from Husband to the Office of
Recovery Services, which only collected
child support payments from Husband.
On February 25, 1988, Wife filed an Order to Show Cause seeking judgment for
alimony arrearages. Husband requested
the court to enforce the previous alleged
oral agreement terminating alimony by entering a nunc pro tunc order as provided
for in Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989), or,
in the alternative, to find that Wife was
estopped from collecting the alimony because of her conduct.
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The trial court found that no enforceable
stipulation had been reached to eliminate
alimony. The court further found that
Wife had not cohabited since the divorce
nor should she otherwise be estopped from
collecting the arrearages. The court
awarded Wife $19,400 in arrearages and
ordered both parties to pay their own attorney fees and costs.
Husband appeals, claiming the trial court
erred in (1) failing to properly apply Utah
Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989) to this action,
and (2) finding that Wife was not estopped
from collecting the alimony arrearages.
Wife cross-appeals, requesting her attorney
fees incurred on appeal.
ENFORCEABILITY OF STIPULATION
The trial court refused to enforce Husband and Wife's alleged oral agreement to
terminate alimony as of 1973. The court
relied upon a procedural rule relevant to
the enforceability of in-court stipulations,
concluding: "This court finds that there
was neither a stipulation between the parties as evidenced by a signed writing nor
an agreement of the parties stated in court
before a judge on the record as required by
Brown v. Brovm, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah, App.
1987)." l In essence, the trial court found
that-any alleged "stipulation" of the parties to terminate alimony in 1973 was not in
writing nor entered into in open court as
required by Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-504(8)2 and was therefore unenforceable.
[1,2] We believe the trial court's reliance on rule 4-504(8) was misplaced.
First, there is nothing in the record to

1. We note there is a conflict within this court
sider this issue. However, the author agrees
concerning whether all settlement agreements
with the majority in Zions that all agreements
are "stipulations" covered by the Code of Judisettling pending litigation need not meet the
cial Administration Rule 4-504(8). In Brown v.
procedural requirements of rule 4-504(8) in orBrown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah Ct.App.1987), this
der to be enforcable.
court found that stipulations must be in writing
or submitted in open court to be enforceable, id 2. Rule 4-504(8), the substantially similar succesat 335, relying, in part, on the predecessor to
R.PracDist. & Cir.Ct. 4.5(b). prorule 4-504(8). In Zions First Natl Bank v. Bar- sor to Utah
M
bara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478 (Utah vides that [n]o orders, judgments, or decrees
based upon stipulation shall be signed or enCt.App.1989), another panel of this court found
tered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed
that certain settlement agreements need not be
by the attorneys of record for the respective
in writing to be enforceable. Id at 480 n. 1.
parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulaWe agree with Judge Bench's dissent in Zions
tion was made on the record."
that the two cases are not distinguishable. Because of our holding, we need not directly con-
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establish that this procedural rule was in
effect at the time of the putative stipulation in 1973.3 This court will not apply an
amended rule of procedure if it impairs the
rights of a party. Jensen v. Fames, 30
Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974).
Furthermore, "[u]nder general rules of
statutory construction, where two statutes
treat the same subject matter, and one
statute is general while the other is specific, the specific provision controls." Floyd
v. Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d
401, 404 (Utah Ct.App.1989); see also State
v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1983);
Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1209
(Utah 1980); State v. Bumham, 87 Utah
445, 49 P.2d 963, 965 (1935).
[3] Husband requested the trial court in
a domestic case to enter an order nunc pro
tunc to enforce the alleged prior oral agreement of the parties that alimony would
terminate. In the marital law area, Utah
permits courts to enter orders nunc pro
tunc upon a showing of good cause:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon
its finding of good cause and giving of
such notice as may be ordered, enter an
order nunc pro tunc in a matter relating
to marriage, divorce, legal separation or
annulment of marriage.
.^-. ^
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1989)7)jqs£*.
[4] We believe the domeslicnunc pro
tunc statute is the specific statute intended
to cover this situation, not the more general procedural rule on written stipulations
found in rule 4-504(8). If we were to find
otherwise, rule 4-504(8) would, in effect,
repeal the domestic nunc pro tunc statute,
section 30-4a-l, as it would seldom apply.
[5] Although the trial court focused on
the general procedural enforceability of a
stipulation rather than on whether a nunc
pro tunc order was appropriate under the
facts presented, this court may affirm "if
the trial court's decision can be sustained
on any proper legal basis." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). Thus, we must determine if
3. Nor is there evidence in the record that the
prior Utah R.Prac.Dist. & Cir.Ct. 4.5(b) was in

the findings of the court below or the undisputed evidence in the record support a
decision not to enter a nunc pro tunc order
under section 30-4a-l.
[6] In Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244
(Utah Ct.App.1987), this court interpreted
the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l
(1989). The Home court stated that "the
legislative history reveals an intent to give
the courts broad discretion to enter orders
nunc pro tunc in domestic proceedings
where an obvious injustice would otherwise
result." Id. at 248. Thus, the inquiry is an
equitable one.
The Home court held section 30-4a-l
eliminated the common law nunc pro tunc
requirement of a previously-entered final
order and concluded that all that is required under the statute is a finding of
"good cause." Id. The court stated that
"[t]he meaning of 'good cause* must be
determined on a case by case basis, in light
of all of the surrounding circumstances, as
equity and justice require." Id. at 248-49.
[7-9] While section 30-4a-l has a broad
remedial scope, it does not abrogate all the
common law trappings of nunc pro tunc
law. At common law, nunc pro tunc allowed a court to correct its earlier error or
supply its omission so the record accurately reflected that which in fact had taken
place. Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299
(Utah 1984); Home, 737 P.2d at 246.
Cases in which courts traditionally have
applied the nunc pro tunc doctrine fall into
two categories:
(1) those in which one of the parties died
after the submission of the case to the
lower court for its decision, but before
the actual rendition of judgment; and (2)
those in which a judgment has in fact
been rendered by the lower court, but
the clerk has failed to perform the ministerial function of entry.
6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
11 58.08 (1989).
The second category is based upon the
principle that "where the delay in rendereffect.
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ing judgment or decree arises from the act
of the court, that is, where the delay has
been for its convenience, or has been
caused by the multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of the questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties, but within
the control of the court; the judgment or
the decree may be entered retrospectively. . . . " Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62,
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881) (emphasis added); see also 6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal
Practice H 58.08 (1989).

justice" resulted from enforcing the prior
alimony order as entered in 1973.
ESTOPPEL

[13] Husband argues in the alternative
that Wife should be estopped from collecting the alimony arrearages because she
cohabited after the divorce and unreasonably delayed the filing of her action to
collect alimony arrearages. In Ross v.
Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979), the court
recognized the theory that a spouse may be
estopped from collecting back installments,
[10,11] These general principles of the but refused to apply the doctrine. The
common law of nunc pro tunc are relevant, court set out the requirements that must
if not controlling, in a determination of be met before a court will apply the docgood cause under section 30-4a-l. In this trine:
case, the court did not make the clerical
In order to prevail on his theory of
error, but taking the facts in the light most
estoppel, plaintiff must prove that defenfavorable to the Husband, Husband did. It
dant, by her representations or actions
is undisputed that the court never received
led plaintiff to believe he need not pay
the written stipulation mentioned in the
alimony or child support, and that plainminute entry. Thus, this alone could suptiff, in reliance on said representations,
port a finding of lack of "good cause"
changed his position to his detriment. In
under section 30-4a-l.
such a case, enforcement of the decree
creates a hardship and injustice to plain[12] Furthermore, a nunc pro tunc ortiff, and defendant would be estopped to
der must, even under the more liberal redeny her own misrepresentations, and esquirements of section 30-4a-l, still be entopped from claiming unpaid support.
tered for the purpose of making the record
reflect what actually was meant to happen Id. at 602-03 (footnote omitted).
at a prior time. Thus, in determining good
The trial court heard evidence and found
cause in our case, the threshold inquiry is that Wife did not engage in unlawful co(1) did Husband and Wife clearly agree habitation after the entry of the divorce
that alimony would be terminated in 1973, decree nor did her actions otherwise constiand (2) was the court prepared in 1973 to tute a basis for the termination of alimony.
enter an order based upon that agreement? The trial court's findings support a concluThe court found that "[t]he parties did not sion that Wife should not be estopped from
enter into any enforceable stipulation to collecting alimony arrearages and we
modify the decree of divorce to terminate therefore find no error.
alimony by the defendant to the plaintiff,"
and "[t]here was no termination of alimony
ATTORNEY PEES
by reason of the actions of the plaintiff."
Again, the court's findings support a con[14,15] Finally, Wife asserts she has no
clusion that the "good cause" required for resources to meet her legal expenses and
the entry of an order nunc pro tunc under
requests attorney fees incurred on appeal.
section 30-4a-l was not present.
We may order either party to pay attorney
Thus, although the magic words "good fees under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
cause" were not recited by the court in its (1989), and this includes attorney fees infindings, the sum and substance of the curred on appeal. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d
court's ruling and the undisputed evidence 465, 470 (Utah Ct.App.1989). See, e.g.t
in the record indicate that no "obvious in- Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah
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1978); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d
156, 162-63 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
Two requirements must be met before a
court will award attorney fees: "the trial
court must find the requesting party is in
need of financial assistance and that the
fees requested are reasonable." Riche,
784 P.2d at 470; see generally Newmeyer
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279-80 (Utah
1987); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862, 864
(Utah 1984); Andersen v. Andersen, 757
P.2d 476, 480 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
The trial court heard evidence on need
and chose not to award Wife attorney fees
and costs. Wife does not challenge the
court's denial of attorney fees below nor
does she assert on appeal any facts in
addition to those presented to the trial
court concerning her financial need. She
does not claim her situation has deteriorated since the trial as tne appellant did
in Riche. Furthermore, wife was awarded
a substantial judgment for arrearages in
alimony which could be used to satisfy her
fees. Based on the foregoing, we deny
Wife's request for attorney fees incurred
on appeal.
In conclusion, we find that no "good
cause" exists to order the termination of
Wife's alimony as of 1973 under the domestic nunc pro tunc statute, section 30-4a-l.
Further, we find that the trial court did not
err in its decision that Wife should not be
estopped from collecting her alimony arrearages and, thus, we affirm the trial
court's decision awarding Wife $19,400 in
alimony arrearages. Finally, we deny
Wife's claim for attorney fees incurred on
appeal.
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur
in the result.

f o | MY NUMBER SYSTEM>

BOUNTIFUL CITY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Luis Lee MAESTAS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 890054-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 8, 1990.
Defendant was convicted in the Second
Circuit Court, Davis County, S. Mark Johnson, J., of driving under the influence of
alcohol, and he appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Davidson, J., held that: (1) initial
encounter between police officer and defendant was not an illegal stop and seizure;
(2) officer's affidavit describing test results
of intoxilyzer machine was accurate; and
(3) admission of affidavits regarding maintenance of intoxilyzer machine was reversible error.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Automobiles <3=349(18)
Initial encounter between motorist and
police officer, where officer approached
motorist and asked questions, was not an
illegal stop and seizure; motorist did not
raise any objection to officer's inquiry nor
did it appear that motorist was detained
against his will. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
2. Automobiles e=>424
Police officer's affidavit which indicated that intoxilyzer machine was functioning properly, even though officer
checked box indicating that machine was
equipped with fixed absorption calibrator
when machine was not equipped with such
a device, did not render test results inadequate in the absence of evidence disclosing
a defect.
3. Automobiles <s=>424, 425
Custodian affidavit and intoxilyzer test
record affidavit were admissible in prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol where affidavits showed on their face
that affiants attested from their own personal knowledge.
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is otherwise affirmed. Each party shall
bear his or her own costs of appeal.
BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

Dawn W. HORNE, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
W. Reid HORNE, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 860060-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 18, 1987.
The 3rd District Court, Salt Lake
County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered nunc
pro tunc order distributing property incident to previously granted divorce. Exhusband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) statute committing broad discretion to trial courts in
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic
relations matters was not limited in scope
to cases involving marital status of the
parties; (2) statute eliminated the commonlaw requirement of previously made final
order; and (3) good cause did not exist for
entry of the order nunc pro tunc.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Courts <3=»114
The court has the power to act nunc
pro tunc—to do act upon one date and
make it effective as of prior date; the
common-law power of nunc pro tunc allows
the court to correct errors or supply omissions to permit the record to accurately
reflect that which in fact took place. U.C.
A.1953, 30-4a-l.
2. Statutes <s=>189
In construing legislative enactments,
the reviewing court assumes that each

term in the statute was used advisedly, and
thus, interprets and applies the statute according to its literal wording unless it is
unreasonably confused or inoperable.
3. Divorce <3=>254(1)
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations was not limited
in scope to cases involving marital status of
the parties, but could also apply to property division problems; by its wording, the
statute applies to any and all matters relating to divorce proceedings. U.C.A. 1953,
30-4a-l.
4. Statutes <s=>222, 239
Statutes are not to be construed as
effecting any change in the common law
beyond that which is clearly indicated;
however, where statute is in derogation of
the common law, and is also remedial in
nature, the remedial application should be
construed so as to give effect to its purpose.
5. Divorce <3=>162
Statute committing broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters eliminated the common-law nunc pro tunc requirement of previously made final order; literal
reading of statute indicated legislative intent to change standard for entry of nunc
pro tunc orders in domestic proceedings
from requiring previously made final order
as delineated by common law to requiring
finding of "good cause," and legislative
history indicated that statute was remedial
in nature; Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298
(Utah), superseded by statute. U.C.A. 1953,
30-4a-l.
6. Divorce <^254(1)
"Good cause" did not exist to enter
nunc pro tunc order distributing property
incident to previously granted divorce;
agreement between parties expressly stated that property was to be transferred to
equalize the marital assets in order to insure that the transfer of property would
not be taxable event, and in entering order
prior to effective date of the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 and without the essential and
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agreed upon tax language, the trial court
either misunderstood how critical the tax
language was to the parties' agreement or
substituted its own judgment for that of
the parties. U.C.A.1953, 30-4a-l.
Richard K. Crandall, Rodney R. Parker,
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant.
Dawn W. Home, pro se.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD
and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's
entry nunc pro tunc of an order distributing property incident to a previously granted divorce. We reverse the district court.
The parties were divorced on January 27,
1984. The divorce action was bifurcated
with the four day property division trial to
begin on June 19,1984. On the second day
of the trial, June 20, 1984, the parties entered into an oral property settlement
agreement on the record. The record reflects the property was to be transferred in
order "to equalize the marital assets of the
parties."
The court approved the agreement and
requested plaintiffs counsel to prepare an
order reflecting the oral stipulation. Defendant's counsel objected to the prepared
order as it did not indicate the transfer was
to "equalize the marital assets," language
which was determinative as to the tax consequences of the agreement. The court
therefore set a hearing on August 8, 1984
to consider the dispute over the tax language.
The dispute over the terms of the agreement is best understood with reference to
federal tax law. Prior to July 18, 1984,
taxation of marital property settlements
depended on the terms of the court's order
or the parties' agreement. In United
States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 82 S.Ct. 1190,
8 L.Ed.2d 335 (1962), the United States
Supreme Court held that a transfer of mar-

ital property incident to divorce was a sale
or exchange, and thus a taxable event. Id.
at 71, 82 S.Ct. at 1193. This imposed upon
the transferring party tax liability for capital gains on the property up to the date of
transfer, and provided the recipient party a
stepped-up basis in the property reflecting
its value as of the date of the transfer.
See I.R.C. § 1001.
In several revenue rulings after Davist
the Internal Revenue Service delineated a
now well-recognized exception to the Davis
rule: if the transaction was an attempt to
equally divide marital assets, and this was
clearly indicated in the agreement, there
was no taxable event within the meaning of
Davis. See Rev.Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B.
26; Rev.Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158. The
parties' dispute over the terms to be included in the order relates to whether the
agreement constituted a tax free equal division of marital assets or a taxable transfer
of property.
While the parties were negotiating over
the terms of the order, President Reagan
signed into law the Tax Reform Act of
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-369. The Reform Act
overruled Davis and provided that no gain
or loss will be recognized to the transferor
in the case of transfers of property incident
to a divorce. Further, the Act provided
that the basis of the property transferred
will carry over and become the basis of the
property in the hands of the transferee.
Tax Reform Act § 421, adding I.R.C.
§ 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and
1239. Thus, for plaintiff to receive a
stepped-up basis in the property she received as a result of the property settlement agreement, the order must have been
entered prior to the effective date of the
Reform Act, July 18, 1984, and could not
contain language that the transfer was to
equalize the marital assets.
Also in this interim period a dispute
arose between plaintiff and her counsel.
Plaintiff alleged, among other charges of
misconduct, that she agreed to the settlement only upon her counsel's representation that she would get the stepped-up basis and his stipulation in court to the contrary was against her instructions.
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At the August 8 hearing, the court considered the charges against plaintiffs
counsel, the dispute over the language to
be contained in the proposed order, and
whether the order should be entered nunc
pro tunc to the date of June 20, 1984.
Plaintiff claimed that unless she received
the stepped-up basis, the property division
was inequitable and unacceptable. Defendant contended the parties' oral stipulation
expressly included language that the
agreement was an equal division of the
parties' assets in order to insure that the
transfer of property was not a taxable
event. The record supports defendant's
contention. The district court eliminated
any reference in the decree to tax consequences and on August 17, 1984 entered its
Order of property division nunc pro tunc
to June 20, 1984.
The effect of the court's ruling was that
the transfer of property was a taxable
event because there was no specific language to the contrary, and the plaintiff
received a stepped-up basis in the property
transferred. Plaintiff then withdrew all
charges of misconduct against her counsel.
On appeal defendant alleges the court
erred in entering the decree nunc pro
tunc.
I.
[1] The court has the power to act
nunc pro tunc—to do an act upon one date
and make it effective as of a prior date.
Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 62,
64-65, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1881); Kettner v.
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 384, 375 P.2d 28, 30
(1962). The common law power of nunc
pro tunc allows the court to correct errors
or supply omissions so the record accurately reflects that which in fact took place.
Kettner, 13 Utah 2d at 384, 375 P.2d at 30.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court considered the application of the doctrine of
nunc pro tunc in a divorce action:
A motion nunc pro tunc is used to make
the record speak the truth; it may not be
used to correct the court's failure to
speak. In other words, the function of a
nunc pro tunc order is not to make an

order now for then, but to enter now for
then an order previously made.
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah
1984) (citations omitted).
In Preece, the trial court read its findings of fact and conclusions of law and
decree of divorce into the record following
a trial between the parties. The husband's
counsel objected to the attorneys' fees included in the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law but submitted the matter to the court for resolution. Prior to the
court's signing of the decree, the husband
died of a heart attack. To prevent the wife
from receiving a portion of her husband's
estate, the trial court entered the decree
nunc pro tunc as of the trial date. The
supreme court vacated the trial court's action despite the harsh result.
The Preece court held the entry of the
decree nunc pro tunc was improper because until the decree was signed the trial
court retained the ability to alter its terms,
which meant there had not been a final
resolution of the matter at the date of the
trial. Specifically, the court stated:
The determinative factor which prevents
the use of nunc pro tunc in the instant
case is the lack of signature on a decree
and the attendant ability of the court to
alter the terms of the decree until it was
signed and entered. Additionally, the
dispute over the substantive issue of attorney fees (in spite of respondent's
counsel's indication that he would leave
its resolution to the trial court) points to
a lack of finality. Because the judge's
oral announcement was not reduced to a
signed written decree prior to the death
of Mr. Preece, a previously made order
did not exist and therefore did not afford
the court the right to employ the nunc
pro tunc device.
However, even if the oral announcement were considered a previous order,
nunc pro tunc was misapplied here. A
nunc pro tunc order should be the reflection of a previously made ruling. The
court had orally announced that the decree was "to become final upon signing."
By making it effective as of the trial date
rather than upon signing, the court al-
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tered its previous ruling. It did not
merely reflect its previous ruling.
Preece, 682 P.2d at 300.
Subsequent to the trial in Preece, the
Utah Legislature enacted a statute committing broad discretion to trial courts in
granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic
relations matters:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its
finding of good cause and giving of such
notice as may be ordered, enter an order
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984).
In support of his contention that the
court erred in entering the decree nunc
pro tunc to June 20, 1984, defendant argues this statutory provision applies only
to marital status and not to the property
division aspect of a divorce. Further, defendant contends that, even if the statutory
language is interpreted to deal with issues
beyond marital status, the statute does not
expand the limited use of nunc pro tunc at
common law as delineated in Preece. Finally, defendant claims that, regardless of
whether the statute otherwise applies, the
facts of this case do not constitute "good
cause" for entry of the court's Order nunc
pro tunc.

[3] The nunc pro tunc statute expressly states the court may "enter an order
nunc pro tunc in a matter relating to
marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage." Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-4a-l (1984) (emphasis added). By its
wording, the statute applies to any and all
matters relating to divorce proceedings.
Had the legislature intended the statute to
be limited to status, it could have easily so
stated.1
Defendant asserts the legislative history
of this statute demonstrates an intent that
the statute apply only in cases of marital
status, such as where a decree of divorce is
prepared but not signed and the parties
subsequently remarry. The Utah Supreme
Court has frequently stated that in construing legislative enactments, courts must
give effect to the legislature's underlying
intent. See, e.g., Millett v. Clark Clinic
Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980).

II.
[2] Defendant argues Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-4a-l (1984) is limited to matters involving marital status. In construing legislative enactments, we assume that each
term in the statute was used advisedly.
West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445,
446 (Utah 1982). This Court therefore interprets and applies the statute according
to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Id.

The legislative history indicates the bill
was passed "because there have been a
number of cases of obvious injustice that
could be corrected by the entry of nunc
pro tunc decrees by the court." TV. of 3rd
Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983,
comments of Rep. Lorin Pace. Representative Pace, sponsor of the Bill, gave a variety of diverse examples wherein entry of an
order nunc pro tunc might be appropriate
including: where the parties, believing they
were divorced, entered into subsequent
marriages (status); where a death occurred
after a divorce proceeding had been heard
but before the order had been filed (status
incident to property division); and where
there was a clerical error in filing the divorce papers (status and/or property division). Id. The legislative history includes
examples of both status and property divi-

1. For example, Cal. Civil Code § 4515 (West
1970), prior to its 1983 amendment, stated that
upon the filing of a final judgment nunc pro
tunc "the parties to such action shall be deemed
to have been restored to the status of single
persons as of the date affixed to such judgment."
Id. (emphasis added). See In Re Marriage of
Frapwell, 53 Cai.App.3d 479, 485. 125 Cal.Rptr.
878, 881 (1975) (where no second marriage was
involved, entry of a divorce decree nunc pro
tunc was inappropriate).

Similarly, the Washington statutory scheme
allowing for entry of final divorce decrees nunc
pro tunc contains limiting language that upon
entry of such decree, "the parties to such action
shall be deemed to have been restored to the
status of single persons as of the date affixed to
such judgment." Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 26.09.290 (1973) (emphasis added). See Pratt v. Pratt,
99 Wash.2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983) (entry of
decree nunc pro tunc proper only when necessary to validate a subsequent marriage).
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sion problems which demonstrate a need
for the legislation. Furthermore, the legislative history reveals an intent to give the
courts broad discretion to enter orders
nunc pro tunc in domestic proceedings
where an obvious injustice would otherwise
result
Our review of the statutory language
and legislative history of Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-4a-l (1984) reveals no intent on the
part of the legislature to limit the scope of
the nunc pro tunc statute only to cases
involving the marital status of the parties.
III.
Defendant further contends that the
statute does not eliminate the common law
requirement of a previously made final order as discussed in Preece v. Preece, 682
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984). This contention is
contradicted by sound principles of statutory construction and by the legislative history of the nunc pro tunc act.
[4] Statutes are not to be construed as
effecting any change in the common law
beyond that which is clearly indicated.
However, where a statute is in derogation
of the common law, and is also remedial in
nature, the remedial application should be
construed so as to give effect to its purpose. Terry v. Lincscott Hotel Corp., 126
Ariz. 548, 617 P.2d 56, 60 (1980); see Marsland v. Pang, 701 P.2d 175, 192-93 (Hawaii
App.1985); cf. Hansen v. Utah State Retirement BcL, 652 P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah
1982).
[5] A literal reading of § 30-4a-l indicates a legislative intent to change the
standard for entry of nunc pro tunc orr
ders in domestic proceedings from requiring a previously made final order as delineated by common law, to requiring a finding
of "good cause." As pointed out by Justice
Stewart in his dissent in Preece:
The Legislature has recently enacted a
statute that commits broad discretion to
trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc
2. The analysis and holding in Preece v. Preece,
682 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) therefore has been

orders in domestic relations matters
All that need be shown is "good cause."
Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 298, 302 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Further, the legislative history reveals
the statute was remedial in nature. The
purpose of the statute was described by
Rep. Lorin Pace as follows:
And the reason this bill is before us is
because there have been a number of
cases of obvious injustice that could be
corrected by the entry of nunc pro tunc
decrees by the court
7V. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan.
27, 1983.
Moreover, the examples given by Rep.
Pace during the Bill's third reading indicate
an intent to overrule the common law approach to nunc pro tunc orders which was
causing "obvious injustice." Indeed, Rep.
Pace made specific reference to the Preece
-type situation where at common law, due
to a husband's death occurring after a divorce proceeding has been heard, but before
the order has been entered, a wife is entitled to a widow's portion of the estate
rather than the provisions agreed to in the
divorce proceeding. Clearly the statute
sought to remedy the injustice caused by
the common law approach.2
IV.
Having found that Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-4a-l (1984) allows the granting of
nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations
matters upon a finding of "good cause," we
now face the question of whether the trial
court's entry of his Order nunc pro tunc
in this case was based upon "good cause."
[6] In defining "good cause" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (1984),
it must be borne in mind that the legislative history indicates an intention to give
the courts wide discretion to prevent "obvious injustices." The meaning of "good
cause" must be determined on a case by
case basis, in light of all of the surrounding
circumstances, as equity and justice restatutorily overruled.
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quire. See Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d this matter." In entering the order prior
402, 407 (Mo. 1963); In Re Estate of Cor- to the effective date of the Reform Act,
bett, 203 Neb. 392, 279 N.W.2d 89, 95 and without the essential and agreed upon
(1979); cf. Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. tax language, the court either misunder390, 394 (W.D.Ark.1958); Daly v. Daly, 533 stood how critical the tax language was to
P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J., the parties' agreement or substituted its
own judgment for that of the parties, and it
dissenting in part).
In the case before us, defendant con- misused its nunc pro tunc power to actends there was no basis for a finding of complish that aim. Furthermore, a fair
good cause and thus the entry of the order reading of the record indicates that in
nunc pro tunc. The district court express- reaching its decision, the court improperly
considered plaintiffs offer to drop the misly found:
The Court finds that with the recent un- conduct charges against her counsel in reexpected change in the tax laws that turn for entry of the order nunc pro tunc.
good cause exists to grant Plaintiffs Mo- Such conduct does not constitute "good
tion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact cause" for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
and Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc § 30-4a-l (1984).
Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984. The court
Reversed and remanded for entry of the
further finds that the Defendant was order of property division effective August
given proper notice of such Motion.
17, 1984. No costs.
If the court had entered its order nunc
pro tunc to give effect to the parties'
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.,
expressed intentions prior to the change in concur.
the tax laws, good cause no doubt would
exist. Our review of the record, however,
( O | KEY NUMBER SYST£M>
reveals the contrary. The agreement
reached between the parties on June 20
expressly states: "[The property] will be
transferred to her as an exchange item to
equalize the marital assets of the parties in
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24 Utah 2d 314
Elaine Siddoway RICHARDS, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Henry Ralph SIDDOWAY, Mary Siddoway
and Ben Morrison, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 11800.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 11, 1970.

Action to determine ownership of land,
wherein defendant asserted that decree in
prior partition suit contained clerical error
in that it awarded his predecessor in title
only life estate, with remainder to plaintiff. On motion of defendant, the Fourth
District Court, Uintah County, Allen B.
Sorensen, J., ordered correction of the asserted clerical error, and plaintiff-remainderman appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that, where the error, if any,
in the prior decree resulted from failure of
the court to follow written agreement of
the parties, and not from failure of judgment to follow findings of fact, such error
was not "clerical," and thus such prior decree was not subject to amendment on motion in the instant case; and that decree in
the prior case was res judicata as to the
matters involved in the instant case.

2. Judgment €=>306
Where error, if any, whereby decree
in partition suit awarded to one of the parties only life estate with remainder over,
rather than fee, resulted from failure of
court to follow written agreement signed
by the parties, and not from failure of
judgment to follow findings of fact, such
alleged error was not "clerical error," and
thus decree was not subject to amendment,
some ten years thereafter, on motion in
separate action brought to determine title
as between putative remainderman and
successor in title of putative life tenant.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b).
3. Judgment <§=>297
Where error in judgment is not merely clerical, it must be corrected by timely
motion for new trial, by timely appeal, or
by independent suit in equity wherein all
the parties to the original proceeding are
made parties.
4. Judgment <&=>7I2
Final judgment in partition suit
whereby one of the parties was awarded
life estate with remainder over was res judicata in action brought thereafter to determine title as between putative remainderman and successor in title of putative
life tenant.

Reversed with directions.
Tuckett, J., did not participate.

I. Judgment <§=>304, 306
Distinction between "judicial error,"
which may not be corrected on motion after time limited by rule or statute, and
"clerical error," which may be so corrected, does not depend on who made it; rather, it depends on whether it was made in
rendering the judgment or in recording the
judgment as rendered. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(b).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

William G. Gibbs, of Clyde, Mecham &
Pratt, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Hugh W. Colton, of Colton & Hammond, Vernal, for respondents.
ELLETT, Justice.
This is an action to determine ownership
of 20 acres of land. The plaintiff, appellant, hereafter referred to as Elaine, claims
title by reason of a judgment rendered
March 3, 1959, which awarded her the fee
after a life estate in her father, now deceased. That decree resulted from a stipulation signed by seven of the eight
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children x of one William H. Siddoway, deceased, not all of whom were involved in a
lawsuit for the partition of the land of inheritance. That suit was numbered 3652
and hereafter will be referred to by that
number.
The stipulation provided that the four
male children would take the range land as
tenants in common, three of them to receive the fee, the fourth—father of Elaine
—would take a life estate with remainder
over to Elaine, who was his only child.
There was an 80-acre tract of land
known as the McCarrell place, which according to the stipulation was to be decreed "as the interests may appear in the
male heirs." * There was a considerable
amount of other property involved in the
stipulation. The decree of the court gave
to Elaine's father only a life estate in all
of the realty with remainder over in fee to
Elaine.
The decree was filed in the office of the
county recorder on May 27, 1959, and
thereafter all the world was put on notice
that the father had only a life estate in the
land. 3 Subsequently, on September 1, 1959,
the decree was amended to correct a description in the 20 acres apportioned to
Elaine's father.
On January 8, 1961, Elaine's father and
her stepmother gave the land in question to
Ben Morrison for a debt owing to him,
and on January 19, 1962, her father died.
This action was commenced September 16,
1963. A default judgment was granted
and then set aside, and finally an amended
answer was filed on December 31, 1968,
wherein the defendants claimed that the
judgment in case No. 3652 contained a
clerical error in that the decree should
have given the fee to Elaine's father. At
the same time, a motion in this matter was
made to correct the so-called clerical error
in the other case.
I. No point is made on this appeal of the
fact that one child did not sign the
stipulation.

The trial court herein granted the motion to amend the judgment in case No.
3652 under the assumption that he was correcting a clerical error, and by doing so he
deprived Elaine of the fee to the 20 acres
of land involved in this case, and the only
issue before us on this appeal is one of
law, to wit: Is the order purporting to reform the judgment in case 3652 valid ?
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provides as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) * * * (3)
• • * (4) * * # (5) * * *
(6) * * * (7) * * * The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time
and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not
more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. * * * This rule does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.
This rule was based upon Section 10414-4, U.C.A.1943, reading:
The court may, * * * upon such
terms as may be just, relieve a party or
his legal representative from a judgment,
order or other proceeding taken against
him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; and when,
for any reason satisfactory to the court
or the judge thereof, the party aggrieved
has failed to apply for a new trial or
other relief sought during the term at
which such judgment, order or proceed2. It is the one-fourth share of this land
which is involved in this present action.
3. Section 57-3-2, U.C.A.1053.
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ing complained of was taken, the court,
or judge thereof in vacation, may grant
the relief upon application made within a
reasonable time, not exceeding ninety
days after the making or occurrence of
the judgment, order or other proceeding
sought to be relieved from. * * *
Prior to 1939 the reasonable time was
stated to be not exceeding six months.
Since 1939 under both the statute and the
Rules of Civil Procedure, one wishing to
amend a judgment valid upon its face must
move to do so within three months except
for correction of clerical errors. The general rule is found in 49 C.J.S. Judgments §
238:
After expiration of the term at which
it was rendered, or of the statutory period of limitation, in cases governed by
statute, a judgment is no longer open to
any amendment, revision, modification,
or correction which involves the exercise
of the judgment or discretion of the
court on the merits or on matters of substance. The only amendment then permissible is one which is intended to make
the judgment speak the truth by showing
what the judicial action really was, and
not one which corrects judicial errors or
remedies the effects of judicial nonaction; the court has no power at such
time to revise and amend a judgment by
correcting judicial errors, and making it
express something which the court did
not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the first instance. # Judicial
errors in judgments are to be corrected
by appeal or writ of error, or by certiorari, or by awarding a new trial, or by
any means specially provided by statute,
and not by amendment, unless the statute
permits such amendment.
[1] The distinction between a judicial
error and a clerical error does not depend
upon who made it. Rather, it depends on
whether it was made in rendering the
judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered. 46 Amjur.2d Judgments § 202.
[2,3] In case No. 3652 the court may
have erred in giving Elaine the remainder
471 P.2d—10

of the land in question, but there was no
clerical error involved. It resulted from
the failure of the judge to follow the written agreement signed by seven of the eight
heirs of William H. Siddoway but not by
Elaine, although she was a party to the
partition suit wherein the judgment was
rendered. Only Elaine and her father
knew whether the decree entered by the
court was according to their wishes and intentions. Neither of them ever appealed,
and the judgment became final some nine
years before an answer was filed in the instant matter. The record does not show
that the judgment did not follow the findings of fact. Such an error must be corrected by a timely motion for a new trial,
by timely appealing the matter, or by an
independent action wherein all of the parties to the original proceeding are made
parties to a new suit in equity.
The question posed on this appeal has
been answered several times by this court.
In the early case of Elliott v. Bastian, 11
Utah 452, 40 P. 713 (1895), a judgment of
no cause of action was taken against a deceased plaintiff. Since the death of the
party did not appear of record, this court
held that the judgment was not void. Substituted plaintiffs moved to set aside and
vacate the judgment after the six months'
period had run. The trial court denied the
motion, and in affirming the ruling this
court said:
* * * And it is clear that the reasonable time mentioned is the six-months
limit prescribed by the statute. "The
time within which such an order could
be vacated must be held to be limited by
section 473. * * * The court had no
jurisdiction after the expiration of six
months to vacate the order made on a
mere motion for that purpose, the order
not being void on its face." Moore v.
Superior Court, 86 Cal. [495] 496, 25 P .
22. We are of the opinion that the lower court has no authority to vacate the
judgment rendered in this case upon the
application made. * * *
Another case in point is Benson v. Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 P. 142 (1896).
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Here a judgment was entered December
15, 1894. More than six months later
(July 8, 1895) the defendants moved to
amend the judgment by striking therefrom
the provision that costs be rendered against
them. The court on December 9, 1895,
granted the motion. On January 21, 1896,
the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the
order of December 9, 1895. This motion
was granted, and the order purporting to
amend the judgment was set aside. The
defendants appealed from the last order.
In affirming the ruling striking the amendment, this court said:

sheep in question and that findings and decree in accordance therewith be signed and
filed. Thereafter, on August 5, 1897, findings of fact and conclusions of law were
filed and entered awarding judgment
against the defendants J. J. Freeman and I.
E. Freeman for the sum of $485.59, interests and costs. On February 18, 1898, I.
E. Freeman filed his verified petition in
the same case to modify and correct the
judgment on the ground that the court had
found the judgment against J. J. Freeman
only. On September 12, 1898, the court
made the following order:

The term of the court at which the final decree adjudging the costs against
the defendants was made had expired
months before the motion to strike out
was made. In fact, another term intervened. It was not a void decree,—mere
ly a decree in form,—nor was it a decree
pro confesso, or by default. Therefore
the defendant should have entered his
motion during the term at which the de-»
cree was made, or, if he desired a rehearing or new trial, he should have given notice and filed his motion for a new
trial within such time as the statute allowed. That time having passed, the decree could be opened only by bill of review, or by an original complaint for
fraud. "But neither a final judgment
nor a final decree, pronounced upon a
hearing on the merits, can be set aside
after the term, upon motion, for any error into which the court may have fallen. The law does not permit any judicial tribunal to exercise any revisory
power over its own adjudications after
they have, in contemplation of the law,
passed out of the breast of the judge."
1 Freemjudgm. § 101. * * *

That the actual findings of this court
after the trial, and as announced from
the bench, were in favor of the defendant, I. E. Freeman, no cause of action.
That the court inadvertently, and without the knowledge or consent of the defendant petitioner, and against the wellknown and avowed findings of the court,
signed findings and decree whereby
judgment was erroneously and unjustly
rendered
against
I.
E.
Freemen,
* * *#

In the case of Lees v. Freeman, 19 Utah
481, 57 P. 411 (1899), the clerk had made a
minute entry on July 12, 1897, stating that
in the case of John Lees, plaintiff, v. J. J.
Freeman, defendant, the court renders its
judgment and finds for the plaintiff and
against the defendant in teh sum of $456.71 and costs of suit or a return of the

As a conclusion of law the court concluded that the decree signed on the 12th
of July, 1897, and filed August 5, 1897,
should be modified so that the same would
show no cause of action against I. E. Freeman and that the judgment against J. J.
Freeman should stand. The plaintiff appealed from this order. In reversing the
trial court, this court at pages 485 and 486
of the Utah Reports, at page 411 of 57 P.
said:
The record presents a strong argument
in favor of the equitable action of the
court; but our statute does not give ju«
risdiction, under
the
circumstances
shown. In a case such as presented
here, a bill in equity is the proper remedy by which all the parties may be
brought before the court, and where issues may be regularly joined and tried
on all the facts connected with the transaction. * * *
The judgment and findings as originally entered should stand unless correct-
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ed by proper proceedings commenced for
that purpose.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frick in J. P. Fowler Mfg. Co. v. City
Court of Salt Lake City, 54 Utah 541, 544,
182 P. 205 (1919), states the law:
* * * Under the statute in question
here, the application to obtain relief
from a default judgment must be made
in the original action and upon the
grounds stated in the statute. The right
to thus proceed must of necessity be
made in accordance with the statutory
provisions as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Gideon. That, however, does not preclude the respondent from instituting an
independent action in equity to enjoin
the enforcement of the judgment or to
obtain relief if the facts and circumstances justify such an action as pointed
out in the case of McMillan v. Forsythe,
47 Utah, 571,154 Pac. 959.
In Frost et al. v. District Court et al., %
Utah 106, 83 P2d 737 (1938), the trail
court undertook to modify a judgment
some four years after it was entered. It
was contended that the amendment was
merely a clerical error. In the original decree Frost was given rights to a water
flow with a priority of 1891 and subject to
a priority date of 1876 in favor of Allen S.
Tanner. The amendment eliminated the
reference to the priority dates. The court
held the change to be one of substance and
said:
Where there has been no retention of
jurisdiction by the trial court, unaided by
statute, it has no power after the expiration of the term and certainly after the
time for appealing has expried, to
change or modify its judgment in a substantial or material respect. This is well
settled law.
The point was again raised in the matter
of In re Goddard's Estate, 73 Utah 298,
273 P. 961 (1929). There a trial was had
before a judge pro tempore and judgment
entered October 29, 1926. The term of
court terminated November 22, 1926. On
October 15, 1927, a petition was filed alleg-

ing that the proceedings before the judge
pro tempore were invalid for reasons
therein stated. The trial judge on February 28, 1928, made and entered an order
vacating and setting aside all proceedings
had before the judge pro tempore, and an
appeal was taken from that order. In annulling the order this court had this to
say:
By numerous decisions of this court it
is settled that a judgment, not void on
its face, cannot in the same proceeding
by motion, be opened or vacated by the
court which rendered it, except within
six months after the adjournment of the
term at which the judgment was rendered. [Citations omitted.] * * *.
*
*
*
*
*
*
The rule applicable is wholesome and
necessary. There must be an end to the
time when judgment can be questioned.
In this case the protestant had a remedy by motion for new trial and also by
appeal, but she permitted the time limited by law therefor to lapse without seeking either. Nearly a year after the adjournment of the term at which the proceedings were had, she, by a motion, attempted to avoid the judgment upon extrinsic grounds. It is a case plainly
within the rule which denies jurisdiction
of a court to open or vacate its judgments under such circumstances.
The respondent in the instant case did
not file a suit in equity whereby all parties
to case No. 3652 could be brought before
the court. He did not even attempt to
amend the judgment by filing a motion in
that case. Instead, like the cowbird, which
lays its eggs in the nests of other birds to
be hatched and reared without labor unto
itself, he planted his motion to amend the
judgment of case 3652 in this matter and
prevailed upon the judge to sign an order
herein purporting to amend it some ten
years after it was entered.
[4] This order is a nullity, and the
judgment of 1959 is still in force and effect, and as such it is res judicata as to the
matters involved on this appeal. The
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judgment of the trial court is reversed
with directions to enter judgment in favor
of the appellant awarding her the title to
the land in question, together with her
costs.
CROCKETT, C. J., CALLISTER and
HENRIOD, JJ., and ALDON J. ANDERSON, District Judge, concur.
TUCKETT, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.

V5\

Boundaries <S=>37(I)
Where there was no affirmative evidence to establish location of center of section as it was created by United States
Government survey, and location of common boundary of parties could only be determined by its tie to center of section,
judgment based on private survey tied to
railroad's right-of-way was erroneous.

Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker, Albert R. Bowen, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Leon M. Frazier, Provo, for respondents.
CALLISTER, Justice.

24 Utah 2d 321
BARBIZON OF UTAH, INC., Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
GENERAL OIL COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents.
No. 11364.

Supreme Court of Utah.
June 9, 1970.

Consolidated quiet title actions involving boundary dispute between fee holders
of adjoining parcels of land. The Fourth
District Court, Utah County, Joseph E.
Nelson, J., rendered judgment for defendants and denied plaintiff's motion to amend
judgment or grant new trial, and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister,
J., held that where there was no affirmative evidence to establish location of center
of section as it was created by United
States Government survey, and location of
common boundary of parties could only be
determined by its tie to center of section,
judgment based on private survey tied to
railroad's right-of-way was erroneous.
Reversed and remanded for disposition
in accordance with opinion.
Crockett, C. J., concurred specially and
filed opinion.

This action involves a boundary dispute
between the fee holders of adjoining parcels of land situated in Provo, Utah. Each
party initiated a quiet title action against
the other, and the two cases were consolidated for trial. The trial court rendered
judgment for the defendant, General Oil
Company, and subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment or to
grant a new trial. Plaintiff, Barbizon of
Utah, Inc., has appealed on the ground that
there is insufficient evidence to support
the judgment.
'The abstracts of title of both parties are
in evidence. The'root title of both parcels
was a patent from the United States of
America to James Smith, wherein he was
granted the southeast quarter of Section
36 in Township 6 South of Range 2 East
"according to the official plat of the survey of said lands, returned to the General
Land Office by the Surveyor General."
Subsequently, Smith conveyed a parcel
of land to one Baum, General Oil's predecessor in interest, and a parcel to one
Bean, Barbizon's predecessor in interest.
These two parcels were contiguous, sharing a common east-west boundary; the descriptions did not overlap. Both conveyances had as a starting point in their descriptions the northwest corner of the
southeast quarter of Section 36, the center
of the section. After Baum's death, the

MEAGHER v. EQU IT OIL COMPANY
Cite as 29

5 Utah 2d 10G
N. J. MEAGHER, Jr., Mary Alice Arentz,
Katherine C. Ivers, Margaret Frances
Price, N. J. Meagher and Katherine T.
Meagher, his wife, Plaintiffs, Respondents
and Appellants on Separate Appeal,
v.
EQUITY OIL COMPANY, a corporation,
Weber Oil Company, a corporation, Joe T.
Juhan, Paul Stock, and All Unknown Persons who claim any interest in the subject
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Action to quiet title to land covered
by an oil and gas lease. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Uintah County, R. L.
Tuckett, J., entered order vacating prior
order on ground that prior order had been
erroneously made and was in conflict with
judgment previously entered, and all parties appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that, where trial judge thought
he was signing an order requiring oil company to release one-half of proceeds of oil
production to named persons, who had been
determined to be entitled to such half, but
such persons had been currently receiving
such funds so that effect of order was to
release to them one-half of the other half,
to which they were not entitled, judge's action did not represent an error in judgment
but constituted a mistake of a perfunctory
or clerical nature and was type of error
which judge could properly correct upon
his own motion.
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2. Judgment €=306, 316
Where, in action to quiet title to land
covered by an oil and gas lease, trial judge
thought he was signing an order requiring
oil company to release one-half of proceeds
of oil production to named persons, who had
been determined to be entitled to such half,
but such persons had been currently receiving such funds so that effect of order
was to release to them one-half of the other
half, to which they were not entitled, trial
judge's action did not represent an error
in judgment but constituted a mistake of a
perfunctory or clerical nature and was
type of error which judge could properly
correct upon his own motion. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 7(b), 60(a).
3. Courts <S=>116(1)

Court's authority to cause its proceedings and its judgments and orders to be
correctly set forth in its records is necessarily inherent in its powers for the purpose of administering justice. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 7(b), 60(a).
4. Lis Pendens €=24(1)
One who buys property with knowledge that it is in litigation is bound by
judgment rendered in such litigation.1

5. Stipulations €=14(1)
Where plaintiffs' predecessor stipulated that fund made up of accumulated
royalties due under oil and gas lease should
be held by oil company as long as title questions to the lease persisted and until the
court otherwise ordered, it would be assumed that this was until final determination, and, therefore, court would not determine whether a wrongful and designed
Judgment affirmed.
withholding of the royalties might provide
basis for cause of action for enhancement
of income taxes to plaintiffs upon payment
I. Judgment <§=>306, 363
to them of the total fund over what they
Motions <S=358, 59(1)
would have paid in income taxes had they
Court may vacate, set aside, or modify received the royalty income as it accrued.
its orders or judgments which have been
entered by mistake or inadvertence and 6. Judgment <S=>2I6, 217
In action to quiet title to land covered
which do not accurately reflect result of its
judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules by an oil and gas lease, judgment, which
7(b), 60(a).
was referred to as an interlocutory judgI. Whitraker v. Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53 P. 730.
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nient and decree, would be considered as
interlocutory to extent that it was necessary that there be an accounting as to proceeds due plaintiff in accordance with her
interest and payment thereof but would be
considered as final to extent that it determined rights of parties in the lease.

N. J. Meagher, Sr., which in this later
phase of the litigation has been the subject
of dispute between the parties. The other
one-half interest (referred to as the "Phebus half") is now owned by the defendants,
Stock, Joe T. Julian and Weber Oil Company, who derive their interest through
Phebus, and which interest is not in dispute
here.

Ray Rawlins, Jones & Henderson, Gustin, Richards & Mattssnn, Burton \V. Musscr, Salt Lake City, Oliver W. Stcadman,
Cody, Wyo., Richard Downing, Denver,
Colo., for appellants.
Herbert Van Dam, Jr., Salt Lake City,
Gilbert C. Wheat, San Francisco, Cal., for
respondents.

The original action was instituted by N.
J. Meagher, Sr. in 1944. While the litigation has been pending, the Equity Oil Company, in 1948, with full knowledge of the
parties, and under an agreement with
Stock, Julian and Weber Oil Company, entered upon the property, drilled and discovered oil; and since that date has continued to produce and sell the oil from the
property. The parties, including the plaintiff, N. J. Meagher, Sr., and the defendants,
Stock, Juhan and Equity Oil Company,
stipulated in court that the ownership of
these parties is SU/2% of the oil rights under the lease, there being 181/2% interest
therein outstanding as royalties not involved in the litigation. As to the onehalf interest (the Stock half) claimed by
Meagher, and his children, who are his assignees and present plaintiffs, it was agreed
that Equity Oil, "has impounded, set aside
and holds in a special account 40.75% of
the gross crude oil runs from said property
after deducting operating expenses and
will continue to so impound such per cent
of gross crude oil runs as long as title questions persist and until the court otherwise
orders" and the court made and entered its
minute entry in accordance with such stip;
ulation.

CROCKETT, Justice.
This litigation is before this court for its
fourth engpgement, having been here on
three prior occasions. 1 These repeat performances arc not due to the merit of the
controversy nor to the popularity of the
subject matter with this court. They seem
rather to stem, to a considerable extent,
from an unwillingness of defendants to
recognize and perform their obligations to
plaintiffs as adjudicated in prior proceedings.
The controversy centers around rights in
a lease, referred to as the "Sheridan lease"
in certain oil lands in Uintah County. The
origin and history of this lease are set out
in our prior decisions referred to above,
and, except to the extent incorporated
herein, do not warrant repetition here.
The original bases of the rights of the parties in the Sheridan lease are immaterial
here except to say that the defendant, Paul
Stock, and one Ray Phebus were assignees
of rights therein; and that in 1944, for
reasons likewise not material here, Stock
executed an instrument called a "Release"
of his interest (hereinafter called the
"Stock half") in the lease to the fee holder,
I. Mcrpher v. Uintah Gas Co.,
(October 27, 1047) 112 Utah
P.2d 747; Phobtis v. Dnnford.
(November 8, 1048) 114 Utah
P.2d 07.1; Meagher v. Uintah

No. 0972
140, 185
No. 7187
202. 108
Gas Co.,

The lower court decided the issue as to
the effect of the Stock "release," relating
to the Stock half interest, in favor of Meagher, which was affirmed by this court m
Case No. 7723 February 11, 1953.2 Upon
remand to the District Court Stock and
Juhan, and Weber Oil Company, their sueNo. 7723 (February 11, 1033) Utah, 255
P.2<1 980. Rchcariug donicd January l9,
1954.
2. Foot note 1, supra.
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cessor, and Equity Oil Company failed and
refused to account to the plaintiffs. This
was based in part upon the ground that the
latter two companies were not parties to
the prior proceedings. Plaintiffs then, in
May, 1954, commenced this acHon joining
said companies as defendants with the individuals named, seeking to have the question of their ownership determined as
against all of the defendants; for an accounting of the operation and proceeds
from oil production on the leased property
and payment of proceeds due thern; and
added a fourth count for damages for increased income taxes plaintiffs allege they
will have to pay because the income was
not paid to them as it accrued. Pursuant
to motion, the trial court dismissed this
fourth count in December, 1954.
The parties made motions for summary
judgment and the trial court heard arguments in support thereof in May, • 1955.
Thereafter on October 14, 1955, the court
made and caused to be placed in the file
his written "Rulings on Motions" by which
he determined the following:
1. That the defendants Juhan and Stock
are bound by the decision handed down by
this court in 1953 and are precluded from
litigating issues that were or could have
been raised there;
2. That the Weber Oil Co., being in
privity with Stock and Juhan, is also bound
by the former judgment;
3. That the Equity Oil Company
pears only as a stakeholder, and that it
maintained a special fund of at least
75% of the "gross crude oil runs
turns]" after expenses of operations;

aphas
40.[re-

4. That the plaintiffs are entitled to a
summary judgment against Equity Oil
Company for an accounting of the operations and profits of the oil produced by that
company on the lands in question, and for
a judgment against Equity for an amount
equal to one half the proceeds after operating expenses are deducted.

13, 1955, the court entered its Interlocutory
Judgment and Decree in accordance with
the above recited "rulings on motions";
adjudging that plaintiffs are entitled to an
undivided one-half interest in the lease as
against Weber Oil Company; and also as
against Stock and Juhan, in accordance with
the former judgment; that Equity Oil
Company as stakeholder be required to
render an accounting to the plaintiffs of
the oil production and sale, and to pay to
plaintiffs 40.75% of the gross proceeds,
less one-half of the operating expense;
and authorized said payment to be made
from the impounded funds held by Equity.
A procedural difficulty developed which
has given rise to much perplexity. On the
same day as the Interlocutory Judgment
was signed and entered, December 13, 1955,
Judge Tuckett, at his chambers in Vernal,
Utah, signed the order which has been the
cause of the mischief. It was presented to
him by attorney Burton W. Musser, without having served it upon opposing counsel
or indicating to them that such an order
was being presented to the court. It directed that Equity Oil Company pay to
Stock and Juhan one-half of the funds impounded and held by Equity. It will be
noted that there was no stipulation that
proceeds due the Phcbus half of the lease
should be impounded; that Stock, Juhan
and Weber Oil Company had been currently receiving that share (40.75%) of the
proceeds, and that payment to them of an
additional one-half of the other half of the
funds which had been impounded, would
give them a total of three-fourths of the
proceeds. This was not in accordance with
the prior decision of this court, nor with
the subsequent judgment of the trial court
which had just been entered.

Upon the same day as he signed the order, the trial judge advised plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Herbert Van Dam, Jr., by telephone of the fact that Mr. Musser had
presented such an order. Mr. Van Dam
asked the judge if it would affect the rights
After considering proposed findings and of the plaintiffs, to which the judge anjudgments submitted by the respective par- swered that it was his understanding that
ties, and objections thereto, on December it would not, but would merely permit the
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defendants to withdraw the one-half of
the proceeds to which they were entitled,
and that it was their privilege to divide
it among themselves as they saw fit. Within minutes thereafter, Mr. Van Dam telephoned back to Judge Tuckctt and asked to
be advised as to the exact contents of the
order. Upon learning thereof, he explained to the judge that the order did seem to
be in conflict with the judgment and decree
he had entered. Whereupon the judge advised that he did not so intend; that he
would withhold the order and take it back
to Provo with him, and would hear the
parties as to the propriety of the order.
He asked Mr. Van Dam to notify defendants' counsel of such fact. It appears that
some unsuccessful efforts were made to
contact Mr. Musser by telephone. Upon
return to his principal office in Provo,
Judge Tuckctt, on December 15, 1955, on
his own initiative, entered an order vacating the order of the 1.3th, reciting that he
did so on the ground that the order of the
13th was erroneously made and was in conflict with the judgment he had previously
entered. Thereafter, plaintiffs noticed a
motion for an order clarifying the record
with respect to the inadvertent order of
December 13. Before the hearing thereon,
Mr. Musser filed an application to disqualify the district judge, to which maneuver one may attach his own significance.
The defendants took the position in the
court below that the order signed on the
13th was the valid and subsisting judgment ; that the court was without authority
to enter the corrective order of the 15th,
and that the same is a nullity. They maintained that position when intermediate appeal was sought before this court, and so
maintain that position in the present proceeding. Inasmuch as all parties have appealed and have variously stated the divers
3. In re Costa's Estate, Cal.App., 224 P.
2d 851; State ex rel. Vaughn v. District
Court, 111 Mont. 552, 111 P.2d 810;
Boylan v. Marine, 104 Cal.App.2d 321,
231 P.2d 92.
4. Rule 7(b): " * * * Any order made
without notice to the adverse party may

issues they each contend are raised, we do
not delineate them, but proceed to consider
the basic issues in controversy between the
parties.
[1-3] The first question relates to the
conflicting orders of December 13 and December 15, 1955, and which of them is
valid. It is well established that the court
may vacate, set aside, or modify its orders
or judgments entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not accurately reflect
the result of its judgment. 3 It is plainly
apparent that the trial court thought he
was signing an order that Equity Oil release the one half of the proceeds of oil
production to Stock and Juhan which it
had been adjudicated previously that they
were entitled to (the Phebus half), and that
the judge did not know that they had been
currently receiving such funds, nor that
the effect of the order he signed would
have been to release to them one half of
the other half (the Stock half) of the funds
to which it had been adjudicated that they
were not entitled. This act did not reflect
his judgment, and, therefore, does not
represent an error in judgment on his part.
It was a mistake of a perfunctory or clerical nature apparently resulting from an erroneous assumption that the order as prepared by counsel correctly reflected the
judgment of this and the lower court It
is the type of error the court could and
properly did, correct upon its own motion.
The authority of the court to cause its proceedings and its judgments and orders to
be correctly set forth in its records is necessarily inherent in its powers for the purpose of administering justice. 4
Related to the matter just discussed is
the contention here made that the adjudication that plaintiffs are entitled to onehalf interest in the proceeds of the lease
relates to the "Stock half." This is based
be vneated or modified without notice
by the judge who made it, * * *";
see also National Farmers Union Property and Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah
2d 7, 286 P.2d 249; see also 60(a) U.R.
C.P.; and see Wilson v. Los Angeles
County Employees Ass'u, 127 Cal.App.2d
285, 273 P.2d 824.
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on the assertion that it is not disputed that
the "Phebus h a l f belongs to the defendants, and that the "Phebus half" has not
been in litigation in the present case. The
clarity with which the contrary is shown
by the record in this case renders it difficult to attach any serious credibility to
such an argument. The findings of Judge
Dun ford in the prior case, entered June 4,
1951, clearly and definitely set out the interests in the oil rights in said lease: Julian, %e; Stock, Me; Weber Oil Company, J4; aggregating one half; and the
other one-half interest to Meagher, which
was affirmed by this court in Case No.
7723 ; 5 and the Interlocutory Judgment and
Decree of December 13, 1955, properly accords therewith.
[4] Weber Oil Company is a subsidiary
of Equity Oil Company; the defendants,
Stock and Juhan, were among its original
incorporators; Weber took its interest in
this lease with full knowledge of the facts
concerning the ownership of this property
and of the pending litigation; it has been
in privity with such defendants in connection with the activities of this lease and
the carrying on of this litigation; 6 it was
joined and has been before the court as a
defendant in this action and is bound by
the judgment as are the individual defendants.
Equity Oil Company asserts no claim of
ownership in the property. It is responsible to the plaintiffs for the proceeds from
production of oil from the property as their
interests appear, that is, 40.75% of the proceeds less one-half of the operating expenses. Equity's activities in connection
with this property have been as agent of
Stock, Juhan and Weber Oil Company, and
they are responsible for its conduct in connection with such activities.

roneously dismissed their fourth count,
which claims damages for income taxes
they allege will be enhanced over what they
would have paid had they received the income as it accrued. This is a novel theory
and one with which we have never heretofore been confronted. Plaintiffs cite no
authority supporting it. W e deem it unnecessary to here decide whether under
some circumstances a wrongful and designed withholding of funds might provide
a basis for such a cause of action. In the
instant case, the answer to plaintiffs' contention is found in the fact that plaintiffs
(predecessor) stipulated that the fund
should be held by Equity "as long as title
questions persist and until the court otherwise orders." It is to be assumed that this
was until final determination.
[6] It is further to be observed that
although this court finds no merit in the
contention that the inadvertent order of
December 13, 1955, was valid there were
in fact two orders signed by the trial
judge about which there was dispute between the parties, and that Equity, through
its counsel, has stated and reiterated its
position to be that of willingness to pay
over this money as soon as it is determined
who is entitled to it. It is our intention
that remittitur in this case will fulfill this
condition. We regard the judgment, which
i9 referred to as Interlocutory Judgment
and Decree, signed by Judge Tuckett on
December 13, 1955, as interlocutory only
in that it is necessary that there be an
accounting as to the proceeds due plaintiffs
in accordance with their interests and payment of the same. But such judgment is
final insofar as it determines the rights of
the parties hereto in the Sheridan lease.
Judgment affirmed.

Costs to plaintiffs.

McDONOUGII, C. J., and H E N R I O D ,
[5] The final point meriting attention
is plaintiff's charge that the trial court er- W A D E and W O R T H E N , JJ., concur.
5. See footnote 1, supra.
6. That one buying property with knowledge that it is in litigation, is bound by

judgment rendered in such litigation, see:
Whittaker v. Greenwood, 17 Utah 33, 53
P. 736.

